l. Introduction
There ìs a widespread tendency to formulate insights, proposals or principles in point form, namely as made up of a specific number of items usually presented as a list. Such items will be considered here as the elements of the set which they collectively constitute in any particular case.
This paper is therefore concerned with problems reiating to the representation and comprehension of such sets -whether the elements in any given case are basic: human needs.human values, pinciples, concepts, problems, h,tman ights, hltman responsibilities or components of a poiicy.
The paper explores the possibillty that (irrespective of the nature of the elements in any such case) there may be different kinds of constraints on the distinctions and relationships between the elements, depending upon the total number of elemerrts in the set. Clearly, the toîal number of elements in the iet also affects the manner in which the set can be represented, communicated and cornprehended.
Briefly, therefore, the paper argr"ies that consensus on a Sclement set of human needs (or a S-point programme) for example, implies certain kirrds of distinctions and relationships between the 5 elements. depending solely on the number (e.g. in contrast with a 3-element or lO+lement set). These may not have been met in a given case because the elements are either (a) inappropriately defined, or (b) appropriate to a 4+lement or 6+lement set (with the consequence that there are elements in excess or missing from the set). Inadequacies of this kind are of importance in themselves but also affect the representation and communicability of the set, and ultirnately its role and viability in the psycho-social domain.
2. Context l. The following argument applies only to cases where the elements are conceived as making vp a complete set. It does not apply when the elements have been selected (posibly as a sample) from a larger set. Where the elements are selected on a priority basis, as being the "most important", the argument only applies when this may b.e interpreted as implylng most "fundamentai" or "basic"1.
Ideally the argument should also apply to any numbered list of points in an argument. But, since numbers are usually allocated for convenience to provide a simple structure to a sequence of paragraphs (and only indirectly related to the concepts developed), this is seldom the case. It should however apply wherever the author(s) declare that: "The following points apply", provided "including the following points" is not used or implied. The list of points should theretore have been elaborated through a "struggle" to get the best "fit" -a struggle which may have required much more than superficial reflection over a short period of time2. 2. The sets under consideration contain elements which are essential to the ordering of an equilibrium state or an evolving process (expecially in the psycho' 1 social domain). As such each element is different and has a special part to play. Each complements the others and all are conceived as essential (e.g. in the case of human values or needs). There is a desire that such sets should be well-formed or wellordered, even if some degree of "fuzziness" must be tolerated as the content is clarified through research and debate.
3. The elements in such sets should be equally distinct from one another or else the question arises whether two or more similar elements should not be redefined as one. This said, however, two cases must be distinguished: -the set itself may well be made up of sub-sets whose elements have characteristics in common -some elements may be more directly related to others whilst still being distinct from them. Any ambiguity implied here should be resolved by the form in which the-set is represented (see betow).
-3. Constraints on number of elements in a set l. There is an implicit assumption that authors are free to include as many elements in a set (of the above kind) as they wish. In fact, l-element and 2-element sets are seldom of interest to scholars, although there is a tendency reinforced by public policy considerations to identify lrlement sets (e.g. r/re fundainental value, need, problem, principle, etc.). At the other extreme, 1000-element sets are considered unacceptable, as are 10O+lement, or even 20+lement, sets. The implication here would be that the authors have not made an adequate attempt to regroup the elements in the light of cornmon characteristics. An apparent exception is the matrix, but even here the number of columns or rows becomes unacceptable (for other than special cases) in excess of 20, for example. In fact, the probability of encountering a set with a given number of elements seems to decrease rapidly when the number exceeds about 10. It would be interesting to see whether a survey3 would show any relation to the isotope abundance curve (see Fig. l ) in which the peaks are approximately congruent with the atoms of highest structural stabilitya.
2. Authors are therefore constrained, irrespective of the nature of the set, to reduce the number of elements to something in the region of 10. Each such element, however, may in turn be considered as a (sub)set within which a similar number of elements is admissable. In this way, any number of elements can ultimately be incorporated. This coding procedure is considered legitimate because it facilitates comprehension. The consequences of such a procedure have not been examined -and yet it is this very procedure which produces the sets of vatues, pinciples, problems, needs, concepts, policy ele_ ments, etc. in terms of which attempts are made to order socbl processes and resolve their problems.
3. The objectivity by which elements are selected on the basis of scientific criteria for inclusion in a set is therefore strongly affected by constraints on the ability of the author/observer to comprehend the set as a whole and to render it comprehensible to others. As Christo_ pher Alexander notes (ref . (2) , p.5) it has been shown that there are bounds to man's cognitive and creative capacity. There are limits to the difficulty of a laboratory problem which he can solve (3) ; to the number of issues he can consider simultaneously (4) (5)5; to the complexity of a decision he can consider wisely6. In commenting on relevance judgements in priority determination, a Unesco document notes ..The number of positions on the scale (of relevance) can be at most 6 or 7, the maximum number of different positions amons which the human mind can meaningfuliy discriminate'i (6) 4. This constraint is also reflected in the ,,embodiment" of such sets in social organization, namely in the limits on the size of an effective committee. on the one hand, or on any small encounterftherapy group, on the other (7) . The limit to the number of subordinate bodies which a body can effectively control is of the same kind, particularly as evidenced by the number of divisions reporting to a coordinating or presidential office. Antony Jay has explored many organizational examples of such limitsT. Note that such organizational subdivision is carried out and limited irrespective of the complexity or diversity of the operations or problems with which the body as a whole has to deal.
5. The constraint is also "embodied" in the category sub-division of the thesauri which govern the manner by which information is obtained from libraries and information systems. Note again that this is so irrespective of the complexity or diversity of the subiects recorded in such systems.
6. The constraint may also be noted in the sets of "key" or "fundamental" problems, values, needs. etc.
which are identified as the basis for action programmes. Such a breakdown lends itself readily to lnstitutional embodiment or reinforces institutionai structures which already reflect (and are therefore unthreatened) by this structuring. The predilection for sets of l0 key problems is noted by the editors of the Yearbook of WortO proUlems and Human Potential (ref. (19) , see especially Appendix 3). An excellent example is Unescors own exercise to identify the major world problems with which it is concerned. It found 12 centrates on the 6 problems which emerge from this filtering procedure. (It is perhaps naive to ask what attention will be given to the 994 problems excluded by this procedure.) 8 7. Such is the prevalence of this constraint that it is of interest to identify the conditions under which it is exceeded and the consequences of doing so for the communicability and viability of the sete.
8. Another aspect of the constraint on the number of elements in a set emerges from recent explorations into the psychophysical significance of number as the cornmon ordering factor of psyche and matter (9) . Since this raises the question of the nature of the observer's relation to the observed, this is discussed separatelv below.
Representation of sets: Introductory comment
Herbert Simon notes: "An early step toward understanding any set of phenomena is to learn what kinds of things there are in the set -to develop a taxonomy. The step has not yet been taken with respect to representations. We have only a sketchy and incomplete krowledge of the different ways in which problems can be represented and much less knowledge of the significance of their differences." ((5) p. 78) The problem of representation is generally considered to be of little interest compared with the subject matter of the representation and is seldom a matter of scholarly concerntÓ. One reason derives from the prevalence of evidence that the physical and social environment is hierarchically ordered (10) tt. Now hierarchical structures fre those in which the interactions amongst the subsets are weak in comparison with interactions between the elements within the set. They are therefore referred to as "nearly decomposable" and as such the high-frequency dynamics within subsets are distinguished from the low-frequency dynamics between subsets. Herbert Simon relates this property to the comprehensibility of such systems: "The fact, then, that many complex systems have a nearly decomposable, hierarchic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to understand, to describe, and even to "see" such systems and their parts" ((5), p.108). And clearly once it is assumed that the subsets can be represented individually, or separately in relation to the set and to each other, representation is merely a question of a hierarchy of "maps". Each can be made as detailed as necessary and can be comprehended separately.
It may be argued, however, despite the apparent ease of this approach, that widespread understanding of the many systems within which man functions (or with which he interacts) remains elusive. Indeed complaints about "increasing complexity" are now common. And studies of psycho-social systems have not produced insights to make them more manageable, in fact such systems appear to have become less manageable whilst such studies are produced.
There are three weaknesses in the conventional stress on the prevalence of hierarchical ordering. Herbert Si-3 mon follows the previously cited remark with: "Or perhaps the proposition should be put the other way round. If there are important systems in the world that are complex without being hierarchic, they may to a considerable extent esca-pe our observation and our understandlng." ((5), p.108). Such systems, possibly exerting a "field effect" or based on non-hierarchically ordered networks may indeed be at the root of our difficulties. trt is interesting that the 1970s has witnessed a rapidly burgeoning interest in networks of all kinds and a suspicion of hierarchically coordinated social structures (13) . The relationship between sub-sets of different hierarchies is recognized as being increasingly critical (e.g. in environmental systems). The problem of representing such complex patterns of relationship to facilitate comprehension has not been resolvedr2.
A second weakness derives from lack of clarity on the nature of the set of which the hierarchical set under consideration is a sub-set -namely the super-ordinate set. Each discipline is responsible for its own hierarchical sets, none is responsible for the super-ordinate set (and the interactions between its sub-sets). This relates back to the first weakness. There is little understanding of what happens at the "top" of hierarchies and especially "above" themr3.
A third weakness derives from lack of clarity on the relation of the person creating or observing the set -to that set. Some aspects of this question are discussed separately below. It is particularly important where one or more such sets are expected to order the comprehension of the individual who therefore has the problem of 'Juggling" them into a suitable configuration in relation to his own psychic orderingra. This raises the question of the iconicity of any representation which is discussed betrow.
In discussing the description of complexity, Herbert Simon makes a basic distinction between state descriptions and process descriptionsl5. "These two modes óf apprehending structures are the warp and weft of our experience. Pictures, blueprints, most diagrams and chemical structural formulas are state descriptions. Recipes, differential equations, and equations for chemical reactions are process descriptions. The former characterae Ihe world as sensed; they provide the criteria for identifying objects, often by modeling the objects themselves. The latter characteúze the world as acted upon; they provide the means for producing or generating objects having the desired characteristics. . . . Given a desired state of affairs and an existing state of affairs, the task of an adaptive organism is to find the difference between these two states and then to find the correlating process that will erase the difference. Thus, problem solving requires continual translation between the state and process descriptions of the same complex reality." ((s),p. lll-ll2).
Some of the ways of representing sets are discussed below.
5. Representation of sets: review of rypes 1. Iists: As implied abo're, the most favoured way of presenting a set is in the form of a iist of items or points. Such lists may be unstructured or else items may be grouped into subsets. No other aid is provided for the comprehension of the set. It is assumed that any normal mind will be able to grasp the contenr in a satisfactory manner. Such iists do not identity the nature of the relations between the elements of the set (other than by what is implied by groupilg into subsets).
2. Thesaui: As merrtionetl above, vrhen there are many elernents ihese are classified, with the aid of th.esauri, into subsets at various depths within a thesaurus structure. Again little is provided to aid comprehension, the assumption being that a perscn knows which element is required and that the structure of the whole is of l-ittle irnportance. (There are a number of cornpeting thesauri prepared b)' instiiutions , themselves competing for resources.) 3. TahleslMatrices: The degree of order of a set becomes clearer when it is presenteci in the form of a table, of which there are various kinds (e.g. the periodic table of chemical elements). These blur into matrices as a more general form of tabular presentation, which rnay be multi-dimensionai. Bui here again the rnind has difficulty in coinprehending the whole, although it rnay distinguish the parts. There is a limit to the tolerance fbr complex tables or matrices in policy-making circles, for example, and they are seldom suitable for rnedia-oriented presentations.
4. Diagrams: As the variety of relationships between the elements of a set is recognized to be of importance a diagrammatic form of presentation may be used -even if it means sacrificing the precision of a matrix presentation. There are many kinds of diagrarns ll4). frcm the simplistic to the full detail of a systenr flow chart. But again the simplisric can only serve momentarily to introduce the set. they cannot carry the detail which a highly ordered set demands; whilst the overall significance of the detailed charts eludes the grasp of most mindsl6. It is also interesting to note that there are constraints on the representation of such diagrams on paper due to the limited acceptability of lines crossing each other, multiple line coding, or the use of many colours.
5. YantrasfMandalas: One form of diagram of special interest, because of its deliberate orientation ofward the observer, is the "yantra" (or "inandala", in its circular form). Thcse h-ave been used extensively in Eastern cultures to integrate many hierarchic levels of inforrnation Cetail concerning the universe in a form designed to be both comprehensible and to have a profound impact on the attentive observer. Indeed special practices have been developed for their preparation and user 7. Significant in the light of the weaknesses connected with hierarchical representations noted above, is the fact that here hierarchies are bound together within a common framework with detailed elements on the outer edge of the diagram and the super-orclinate sets linking into a common centre -the focal point for the ob-4 serverrs through whose awareness (once refined) the disparate sets of experience are integrated. The challenge to the observer is to penetrate into and structure his awareness through the diagram. It is especially noteworthy that diagrams of this type contain a high degree of symmetry, as well as colour coding ald symbols of varior-rs knds. (These are in part designed to "trigger" the conditions required of the senses and avrareness in order for the "programme" to rvork.) The symmetry lèaturgs are of course constrained by the planar representation.
6. Other techniques: The paragraphs above would seem to rnark out the current ability to represent sets, given the number of elements, the degree of their ordering, anC the erosion of comprehensibility as the combi nation nr-;rnberf degree of order increases in compler-ity.
There are a number of other techniques of communicating the content of a set. Some are discussed in (16), but they tend to sufîer from the defect of being unable to represent the set in a foim which can be easily reproduced and whìch lends itself to detailed examination and review. It is also appropriate to ncte here that many authors do not summarize their insights as a set of points or insights anC may weil consider sucli a representation as damaging to the nature of the insiglits they seek to commiinicate" Indeed the pre-logical biases, iderrtified by W. T. Jones (17) 1e against such a representation may in certain cases constitute an ultimate constraint on clearlv distinguishing the elements in a set.
I . Three4imensional consttl.rcts 7.1 As noted abovc, diagrarns in 2-dimensions are extensively used to represent sets. It is however very rare to see 3dimensional representations of sets, partly for the obvious reason that it is difficult to see the internal structure of such representations. And, despite the considerably increased facility it offers, 3-dimensional representation creates a barrier to the linear verbal description so essential to the verbal and textual expression on which much research and decision-making is based2o. F{ovrever there are techniques fcrr handling the representation of sets in 3dimensions, of rvhich the most sophisticated are the graphic terminals used in computeraided design ((19) Appendix 5). But it is interesting that, despite rnuch attention to hierarchical ordering in organic and inorganic systems composed of 3dimensional entities" it is in terms of a 2dirnensional representation that such hierarchies are studied2 I . This is so even though the champion of the hierarchical perspective, Lancelot L. Whyte, specificaliy notes that "the real need is for a systematic and exhaustive survey of the types of three-dimensional spatiaì ordering vrhich characterize the more important levels in both realms" (ref. (10) , p. l3). He also remarks that "trVhere a system is 'suffìciently ordered' and 'sufficiently nearly stationary' (terms to be clarified) three-dirnensional geometrical relations (i.e. lengths or angles) may play a fundamental role. . . It is conceivable, in principle, that under certain conditions everything is derivable from angies. It seems that theory may sometimes pass rather easily íronr central geometrical hierarchical nrodels to the heterogeneous properties of static, stationary, or near-equilibrium systems, thus openiirg the way towards a physics of hierarchy" (ref. (10) , p.l1). The equivalence in properties between physical and social svstems has been repeatediy noted (20) .
7.2 A further justiiìcation for nrovrng to 3-dimens;ons is that it increases the iconíciiy of the representation, nanely the degree of isomorphism bet"veen the structure of the reality represenied an<i the structure of the representaiion. Where this is iiigh, comprehensicn is considerabiy facilitated -wllch is why architects communicate nelv r:crrcepts to clients 'ria models and not plarls.
7.3 T'he question now arises as to what reiation the cognitive elements of tire set bear to their representation. This argunreni rs based on ine assumption that in the case of the fundainental eierrrents undei consideration, there is a strong configurational component to their comprehension es nested concepts. fufany of the arguments in support of' (and against) this assumption have been cieveloped by Rudoif Arnheinr (21), wircr states, moreover:
"The aesthetic elerneiit is preserrt in all visual accounts attempted by hurnan beings. In scientifìc diagrams it makes for such necessary cluaiitres as order, clarity, corresponde;rce of rneaning and form, dy'nanric expression cf f-orces, etc. The value ofvisual representation is no iorrger contesied by anybody. What rve need to acknowiedge is that percepùul and pictoriai shapes are not only transiatktns rfi-thougiit products bwt the very flesh and blr.tod of thinking itself . .."((2t1. p. l3a). And also: "In the perception of shape lie the beginnings oi ccrlcept iormatiort." (2i,p. l7). He defines "shape" to include 3<iinrensional forms, though most of his examples are baseci on 2dimensional shapes, especially sketcires and diagrarns. Fle does, however, irnply that a third dimensron (deprh) enrers into perception, when appropdate (as with pictr:res). lt rnay therefore be conclu<led that under certain conciitions man thinks in terms of 3dimensional consiructs, rr.'hetirer or rlot he also thinks in terms of words or 2dimensional shapes. 7.4 in nioving to 3dimensioris a highly signiiìcant constraint emergcs. In 2dimensrons there is, conventionally22 , a certain freedom in that the planar surface ma;' be extended and divided at will (vvithin the limits of line and cclour cclding noted above). Whereas. in 3dimen-sions, what are i<nown as packing constraints become much more significant (23) . The ways in which subsets can be nested within sets may then be severely iimited.
The questicrn is then wheiher snch geolnetiic constraints on representation bear anv relationship to constraints on ihe inlerrelationship between subsets or their elements as concepts in the human rnind. On a hypothetical 2dimerisionai system fiow cirart, one can well imagine over 50 input/output lines drawrr to 3 particular process box-There appears to be no restriction (although there must be electro-nrechanicaì anci computing limits to their control). But at tne conceptual level, the nurnber would be unacceptable (in terms of the constraints noted earlier) and the process box would 5 have to be divided into srnaller rrnits. A Drocess box with 50 inputloutput lines rvould not be a usetul guide to thinking about the system. It is as though eacli such unit could oniy have one of a small range of "valencies", to borrow a chemicai term (24) . Now in 3-dimensiorral representatir-rns the perrnissable vaiencies emerge from the manner in which the sub-components can be packed in contact together (e.g. packing smalì spheres irrto a larger one). In fact this is aiso true in 2-dirnensions (e.g. packing smali circies into a larger one), but at this ievei the number of relationships (i.e. points of contact) is ntore lrrnited than with 3-dimensions. It can of course be argued that in rnany cases such a representation is adequate to the conrplexity represented. The search for irnproved toois is however stirriulated by the failiire of the existing ones to improve coilective, operational understanding of the social condition; the assumption of adequacy may not in fact correspond to the c:omplexity of the environment.
The 2dlnensionai model is not rich enoush to reflect a 3dimensionaì reality atlequately (or with ihe compact elegalce and symmetry that one tnay suspect comprehension of complexity demands). tsut it may also be argued that a 3-dimensional rnodei is equally inadequate at refìectirrg higher Cimensional realities. Ftrowever there is little to suggesr that man tends to think in 4 or more dimensions, even if some can t|únk about thern and represent their results in mathematical terms23. To be comprehensible and wideiy so (in order to be of relevence to sociai change), "it seems safe to say that only what is accessible to the perceptual imagination at least in principle, can be expected to be open to human understanding" ((21),p.293). Hence the vaiue of exploring the conceptual sigrrificance of 3-dimensional repiesentation as opp<lsed to other forms.
7.5 The point by \lhyte cited ab,-.ve "that under certain conditions every'rhing is derivable from angles" has recently been explored independently in a book by Arthur lvl. Young. He argues "a whole object or situation is divided inio aspects (or, to use Aristoile's worci, causes) and that these aspects have an angular relationsltip to one another" (25) , p.XV). He asks: "Is rny opening sîatement, 'AÌl meaning is an angle', too abstract? Not if one accepts my allegation that meaning is in generr.i a kind of relationship" ((25), p.XV). Despite his unique understanrjing of 3dimensions (as the inventor of the Beii helicopter), he oniy applies his approach to 2-dimensionai cases. In a second book (26) , published slmultaneously, he explores related roatters basirrg then on a 3-dimensional concept but he does not link this explicitly to the angular cclncept of meaning.
7 .6 For an extensive exploration of the nreaning associated with the geoinetry of 3 dimensions, it is necessary to turn tc R. Buc:krninster Fuller (see note 4). His preoccupation, despite the subtitie oi his book, is hc.wever with the architectural and concrete marerial implications of his work (of which one application is the geodesic dome which he invented). Nevertheless, L.r his work especially, and in that of others, stimulated by it2a lie the basis for many generalizations in support of the argument here. In particular, as with Whyte and young, he is also sensitive to the general significance ofangle2s. This is essentiai to his basic argument that the focal points for energy events in any system are linked into a closed pattern of relationships which can be effectively represented by an appropriate polyhedron ((1), p.95 and 655). "An the interrelationships of system foct are conceptually represented by vectors. A system is a closed configuration of vectors. It is a pattern of forces constituting a geometrical integrity that returns upon itself in a plurality of directions." ((t), p. 97). No reason is given why this should not apply to a system of conceptual elements constituting the kind of ordered set of interest here.
An attempt by a biologist has in fact been made to use the geometry of the 3-dimensional biological cell structure as a cubic framework in terms of which concepts may be ordered and interrelated (29) . This has been extensively developed (using large-scale 3-dimensional models) as an experiential learning tool. Another very interesting approach (30) . again using a cubìc framework, has been considerably developed -from a model originating in the data-processing industry (31) -in order to provide a way of structuring and representing ideas. Many points relevant to the argument here are discussed, as well as the transition from 2 to 3-dimensions. Whilst interesting and vaiuable as exercises, these raise further points discussed below.
8. Mathematical notations and N-dimensional representations: Much that is of interest with regard to sets and their elements is expressed and represented in mathematical notation which is meaningful to very few (including this writer!). This is the case with the highiy relevant argument of Spencer Brown (18) . It is al"o true of the very reievant insights of Rend Thom who leaves most social scientists, and policy makers behind at his point of departure: "We therefore endeavor in the program outlined here to free our intuition from three-dimensional experience and to use much more general, richer, dynamical concepts, which will in fact be independent of the configuratìon spaces. In particular, the dimension of the space and the number of degrees of freedom of the local system are quite arbitrary -in fact the universai model of the process is embedded in an infinite-dimensionai space." (t3:1. p. 6 ). He does however support the geometric representation argued above: "I should like to have convinced my readers that geometrical models are of some vaiue in almost every domain of human thought. Mathematiciars will depiore abandoning familiar precise quantirative models in favor of the necessarily more vague quaiitative models of functional topology; but they should be reassured that quantitative models still have a good future, even though they are satisfactory only for systems depending on a few parameters." ((32), p.32a). However rich the resultant insights, it is their significance and representation in 3 dimensions which is fundamentai to their value for the comprehension and ordering of social processes.
6. Involvement of the observer/creator of the set 1. Whenever it is convenient, there is a widespread tend_ ency to avoid consideration of the impact óf those involved on research or on the policy_màking process ìn which they participate. Researihers correct-fàr bias in experrments and aim for reproducible resuits. Efforts are made to balance the interests represented at policy meetings. Consequerrtiy, when sets of basic values, problems, concepts, clr principles are generated by either, they are conceived to be objective. The relationship between any such objectively determined category sets and the thinking processes of those involved (or on whom those categories are subsequently "infìicted") is not open to rational discussion in the same arenas and may well be perceived both as impolite and threatening. And yet it is recognized that:
"The categories in terms of which we gloup the events of the world around us are consttuctions or inventions. The ciass of prime numbers, animal species, the huge range of colours dumped into the category "blue", squares and circles: ail ofthese are rnventions and not "discoveries". They do not "exist" in the environment. The objects of the envuonment provide the cues or features on which our groupings may be based, but they provicìe cues that could serve for many groupings other than the ones we mnke. We select and utilize certain cues rather than others." (Jerome S. Bruner et al., (33) This point was however made in 1956. Both in the research on which they report and in subsequent research, it wonld appear that the focus has been on categorization in the case of "laboratory problem" sets which are essentially triviai in comparison with the sets of fundamental concepts which are eiaborated consciously in the course of research (or policy-formuiation). The former are laboratory exercises requiring minutes or hours, the latter involve much reflection and a protracted "struggle" for the best "fit", possibly over a period of many months or years. In particular, to give the kind of "uncomfortable" example that is required, the research has not been applied to the sets and categories selected by those undertaking research in this very area, as an aid to expiaining the differences of opinion which give rise to non-rational behavioural dynamics between the various schools of thought affected. Only "pointed", self-reflexive research of this kind, on the formulators of sets which are fundamental to social poiicy, can help to clarify the basis for the opposition between policies which tends to fragment society into hostile camps.
Laws of'farm
It is not sufficient simply to complain about the widespread tendency to avoid consideration of the impact of those involved in set formation on the sets which they formulate. The reason for such avoidance merits continuing study26.
Part of the probiem seems to lie in a missing iink in the relation of mathematics to logic wirich has been provided, with the encouragement of Bertrand Russell, by G. Spencer Brown (18) . Much of science (and that includes classification) makes explicit or implicit use of set theory based on Boolean algebra which was designed to fit logic -but in doing so detaches the observer from any involvement in the logical processes2?. Spencer Brown argues that: "nobody hitherto appears to have made any sustained attempt to elucidate and to study the primary, non-numericai arithmetic of the algebra in everyday use wl.rich now bears Boole's name" ( l8). p.,-li ). And again: "That rnatheilatics. in conrmon witlt other art tbrms, can iead us beyonci orciinary existerrce, tiiri can show us something of' the structure in wlrich liÌ creation hangs together. is no new idea. Bur maÌhenìatl-cal texts generally begin the storli somewhere tn rhe middle. ieaving the reader to pìck up the thread as best he can. Here the story Ís traced from the begrnning." ((18) . p.v) And. acc<-rrding to Frarrcisco Varela: "By succeeding in going deeper than îruth, to indication and the laws of its form. he has provrded an accourrt of th lor)r. mon ground in which both logic and the structure ,)r rnv universe are cradled . . ." ((41) . p. r.)
The result of Spencer Broivn's fonnil exercise to separate what are knor..rn as algebras oi iogic frorn the subject of logic. and to re-align thern with mathematics, is the expiicit, and extremely elegant logical re-integration of the observer. His final chapter, entitled "reentry into the form" commences with: "The conception of the form lies in the desire ro distinguìsh. Granted this desire, we cannot escape the fornr. although we can see it any way we please" (p. 69) lt ends with: "An observer, since he distinguishes the space he occupies. is also a mark . . . In this conception a distinciion drawn in any space is a mark distinguishing the space. Equally and conversely, any mark in a space drarvs a distinction. We see now that the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only interchangeable, but, in the form, identicai." (p. 7o) Spencer Brown shares the concern of Buckminster Fuller and Keith Critchlow (22) , (36) with the initial conceptualization of a whole and its subsequent subdivision. He explores this using a powerful logicaÌ notation (18) , whereas Fuller and Critchlow explore the structural implications in 3dimensions. The latter would appear to be fundamental to representation and hence to comprehension. Jay Kelley, in considering the connection between man and his knowiedge and the requirements for an adequate information system, arrives at similar conclusions28. of the logical universe of our science-dominated culture. In Part I it was noted that our culture was weak in its ability to handle anything "above" the top of the hierarchies of categories we care to distinguish. His work seems to offer a remedy. For it would appear that there is a "curvature" in the more tundamental hierarchies back to the (otherwise detached) person's involvement: (a) as an observer in the elaboration anci subdivision of such ordered sets (whether conscious or tacit). and (b) as a participanr in the reality which such sets encode. It is the observer/particrpant who links, through his own person, the top and the bottom of a hierarchy. Equally it is the observer/participant who links distinct hierarchies and is therefore challenged or fragmented by any conflict between competing codìng systems to which his perception is subject.
Spencer Brown makes the point that "we cannot escape the form, although we can see it in any way we please" (p. 69). However all forms are not equally probabie, as was argued above in the discussion of the numerical constraints on the subdivision of sets-His own workze explored the ordered emergence of certain forms. René Thom's (32') widely-acclaimed study is concerned with the stability of certain forms (in every donrain of knowledge). of which the "islands of stability" encountered in the pattern of isotopes are a well-known example. His analysis extends to forms encountered in social systems and human thought3o.3r.
He argues that: "It may seem difficuit to accept the idea that a sequence of stable transformations of our space-time couid be directed or programmed by an organuing center consisting of an algebraic structure outside space-time itself. The important point here, as always. is to regard it as a language designed to aid the intuition of the global coordination of all the partial systems controlling these transformations." ((32), p 1 19) This "algebraic structure" (rvhich he expresses in geometric terms) would seem to pla.v a role in the human psyche which is functionally equivalent to the Jungian "archetype"32. Although. even if this possible equivalence is invalid, this does not affect the argument below concerning such archetypes.
6.4 Self-reference and ttme It is Francisco Varela (42) who has further developed the calculus of indications provided by Spencer Brown in order to deal with the many self-referential situations characteristic of our society. "Stubbornly, these occurrences appear as outstanding in our experience. Particularly obvious is the case of living systems, where the selfproducing nature of their entire dynamic is easy to observe, and it is this very fact that can be taken as the characterization for the organization of living systems. Similariy the physiological and cognitive organization of a self-conscious system may be understood as arising from a circular and recursive neuronal network, containing its own description as a source of further descriptions" (p.5). In citing pepcrs r.,,l,rili ii,lrjress tircliseives directl;v to the seif-reicrsn'.isi nar,trrc oi-sucl'r systenis. lre notes lhat th.: tcpir: is '"nrrrnally avcriiiec as uniieslrhble diflìcuity 7t;r circulus rilicsus\." anii tirat su,:h diÍficul-tieri are rooted iri lurrguegc Consisterit with. tiie renrakrs ct' René Thc,nilabr:ve,i. anci tlie preoccupations of vol i;ranz (beltrrv), Vareia argues that the duality of the producer and the l-ìroduccd (which enrbodies the prc.ducer. ai in ariy categor)' encompassing its r.rserì "can be pictuled only when we ieprese ni for ourselve; a seqrlrncL-oi processes oi a c!rcuiar niiture irr tirre. Aoparentiy our cognitrcn rlrinot holti both ends of a ciosing ciicie sintultaneo'.r:ily: lt nìLrst travel tirrr:ugh the circie ccaselr:ssi)'. Tlrerefore we tir,c a pei;uiiar equrvaìence ot seil'-reicrence aiiil tirne, insofar as self--refeierrcg Lanlt(rt'fre ccncetvct'i':rifsiile tirie. iri;,:l tinre ccmcs iir u.'hene'"er seìi'-rcfe reilce is ailo*ieil." ({,J.1), p. .10) Iu l-rìs crvn extenried caiiuius basu,j,;n a l-v:iue,J sytlerìì.''seli'-re fer,:nr-:.'. îiir-ie. uiid re-cntry, ( i; io f..;i:l ) arc seen us asoiìats of tlre -tanre third '.,aìrie iì!"i\ilt ír.ìtù-noirur.rsiy iir riie tcrrn oI ciistuiction'' {(J,l). p. l1). i.iie ol I third ,raiue .liiri;ies ihe :,r,iierl ir; rrrioie seif-refercntial situatituis rvhir:ìr are tiic bi:sl:; irtr ihe liriritaticiit:; exarnlited bt G,,;dei 14,ì1. Il lirs coriciusicrn \t'ai'eia desirii,rs hi:, acliii:vernerit iis f oliowr:
"'l he :taritrig l)oini ot ih.is ialtulur, io!litvving t,hc iic5,1,1i.,.,1 thc c.rit,.rius of illiii,:aiÌons. Ìs tha ìct ,,f i;,tlicltic'rr. in rì:ts pirnrotdtaì Jit u/c srpaÍirlc forrn: whrcli appuJl to rr: as thc rvorìr1 rî.
:cil. []ronr thif :iiartrng pr)int, wil tlnir rsii:rî íll. pntiìtifi oî tìt. r0ic ot ihc ol;scrver rvh,> itrarvs ciirtìleij0|s wiìrfc!ct i,c Itie:;:,.r-'i'irtr:, tire <-iisttni:tiolr ntl,.lt,.r'irrclr cirÌftì(lùr our ituii:l i,:vral 1-irci ir;cir' thaî: the di.ttrl'trons ur'Íal:r litd thcse Cirlile ii:lrtr perialli nìoÌa tij ij trvcidtiùli ol riirclc iiì\l Jir\ervil star:r-ì, ihltii iit iìii rntnnslc r;trnriitrrti,tri uÍ iirc *,orlrl ri ilcli rirpe ais. fr." thir, r'ury mc(ìllairlsm oi si..p.LriÌttcrir llttwcr-liì oirrrrvcr ttìd ,)1.1.,!r'red. Jl\r'Ji \ elrisrve. ln tinding th.. rVcrriri l: \!r..il,). \'Jr forgei ail tvi: tirii t,.r frnd rt as suctr. and wherr wc ar!' Íet.ì'ìll|oe(1 ot it rrì rei;::r!irtd,,ur síeps back to iiìdiiiiiir)ú. rr,c linci iittlr: ntor': lÌirn a irilrror,irifriifror inìaÈ,i ol'úrrr)eivc: lnd tire rvoiltì. lr ,:ot,1rast ':;itit llhlt i. cominr-rrriy .ì\:iuiiìed. e J.lscrìpriÒn, wirr;; c;rrciully iiirr:ccrfli, rc. veals the J)rLìprrtles ol llìr o'Ds,jrver. We. cbscners. dtslingutrit ot:rselves pr'cciseiy by clìstingurshing what uc appalciliìy f,rc llot. thc 'woild.
We thcn sca 'rhat rve r;tand in iclalion to rire i.rorld b-v rrulu:J rìtgatton. ancì thiìt the union ol us trvo has thcrefcre arÌ arlJ, n,Jmo'.i s Jtructure witere by til e ncgittron engr'lìcleÌt :i d jstllrit jOr u,hrch iead:: trr its cv,'n nr'gaticìtì ir a cgiiselcss circulat prc,ccrs ri'hlcir i:. in faci, ihc rirnboi u'hich traditron ha:; cl.iostn lo repr.-sent the creetion of cverythl:g sinrre tirle inrrcitruiiai. Auronomy i: :;een in thrs ìight îc engender thc twr.r slaÈc.; ot lhc fornrv!hcr ihis r:e;isei(}ss Dr,Jce\s is i)iùkcr ii.lro r1s,irir_.tii.; .rnts. By ihe intioriui;tion oi e thìrd eutonomcur \1lt€ il'ì the forln. we dlr nothrng but rsstùre to our tleld oivic\.\,thai -lr",hi.ìì rias thert'a[ thc b*grnnrtrg, and u,hì,:h v,e can orrì1 :ice;ìclr'rr, ilectecl as scÉfiìeitîs ol the u,utit] or n; langu:rÈr: itsrjf. ('ctrrcis,:iy.
by' taking seit'-rcttrence and tiir.re iI\ oùr iìiurn atia<lnir ih:o.-rgli :. succcssion oi lcvels. \i{-. ili.,,cli ',lpln the re-uiìtùl-i !)î tìta c(}n.;fr(ì-; ent: oî thcse levels up iù ,)ur o\\'n u;riotr u iih t hc world, rlril thu: wc iind a','"a;,, to icirlcve thc uiritv origrn:tii;.iosr.'' il.íjr.
p.22 3i 6.5 Number und ttnte Nlarie-l.oi.lise von iìraiiz ioi tire (ì .ì.li,rlig Instiirrie".. Zr_r-rich) iras conducted an extensivell' tleicurrrenied stuili' irrtc', lhe significance oi rrumber for n:rathematicialrs. rn philosopiiy, and as s,vnrbols of osy;hoiogicral rignil,icance. in a deliberate cifùrt to bridge the ;jaÌ,. betrleer," I piyuh{-til)gy aiiu physics, As she pìJts ii, iier rcmarks "1.;aiani:e to :oriie cxîerìt cn tlre i'azor's edge betwcen i;niìt'isr-',phica1-ffìathenlil lirìùi iur d. r rut rrer ì<;al-s,,rrn t-roiicai staterÌienrs" (rei.. (9). p.3l ,i41. Shr: Ceìiberarell, bndges the gap ticln/eeil Westgrn anti othei crlncrilis oj nurni,c:r. x'hich Ís an aspcrrl oi a l:urielìt de ba'ir intc tÌre wllicr-lú11'Íf'r€.tiìtlotì,c of the cqncept:ì 1-rf scierrce. spiìce. and iirrre. which ir;r'e hitiierro bcen sur-;posed io cunfornr conr'.:iirentiy it.r tiie !Vestcm versiorrs í10)13.
SÌie noters ih-ii l-rels iloiir iras sirgsse d tirat an lrtprjÌ-tarrt sÌep irilrJ iteer takc,r towar<.1 realizrng the icieaì '"ot tiaclnf-l:re Cescripiioir of riatuJai phenornen;r back ti-. conilrinati,:ns ol pure numbers, wliich far transcends tire hoiticst cre?,rlìs of the Pyihagi)redits ({,-)). p. lfi). She argirer iirat ii we accr:pt rVolfgant Pauìi's contenticir that "aerf.aln ilatherna.tìcal s'rnictlìies rcsi cn arr archetyila! basis, then their rsr-rmr-rruhisni wiih certain t:ruter-worlci phenciiriena is iiot r,o surprising" ((t) 1. p. 19ì. Sihe suins up her argLinie rrt, as íoiio.,vs.
"T,: sur:.'up: nurlbtrrs liÌìiiriar io repirsclll hotli a'r aîifìbìrie iJi itarter ala ihc uncorrscìous lorrt,ilatrorr oi oui incirtai pr.-';t,,-ses. íior ihts ieato;i. !1ulrl)or fi)rìrs.,Jac,'rd;lg îLì Jrin!. tÌra! a):l ticuilr citùt;rt iììJi ùtìttcs ihc te ai;l cl ii!aiìcr anrJ p:,1.i:he it r:, ''reaì" rn r iìoubic str.ll)!-. iis ln;ìi.ite1),lt;i trriegc lnd:is a q;liiiaiil:
nìiil',llcstetioít rn Iiìit r::riin u1 i:rrIc;'ri'r',lLd cxpc)rcn:'c. Nuniber tircrcl:! tìtioris a l;rirjzc r.Írrss ihe gai) ).jtiiacn t3c f-iii]-sic.rliv kriorvlbìe atrtl iiic i;irlE-lr:,ir'. ln tiiis n:annci it oiJcr,ìtcr eì iì ::tiÌl lrrgclr, 14sr-pÌoie,i rni,i pot;rt !ciilr!'lr iiri t1 i tìrc Ìr)j aijì,ìi anC r3lliil,('riìe J)Ì'ryri!ai). at 1lìc \arjie iir.i-'1.,r.)1jt qLianìilaitve snii q'Jalit:t'iivc. r apresentatiùrrll al d t;l:irrr::ci.i taiiùrìai.
( orist:quc-niil,, ii r: rloa onìi tlte par;Jlelisir, of aùit((t1\ r,')
iiirich ìioirr irrtl Prutr hilr: bcth iirilqu ai.tr'.ti-^iiI wh:ch n,t'r, .rdays draus pill"sic: i'nd p:;rci:,ri,.tgy togcfiret. Lui niolr: :igrrrfi .i,Lrtii' llìa ps1elil tl1'tliriiìrL.. o1 1iìc ii)ìì.ai]i t;l'nlilirir,,i ls;r:r Jri lìci] illl f,( ltÌ:Ililv titpaiìntìq lt, it\ ' tf.ul\.ît.,\-\!fe ,i:i)r,ft il! tììc rúrjit ,.ll rirrtitr Il pri(t'.r\-j,)u.lr L;rdtrs ìri_riii prrtitr". th(Juitlrt pfo!rr:ier lin,-l ti:c trrlrrilt.irliillr ot'ilìllitriiii re..ilrt1 .;\:
tii': rallvú otderrng 1t(ioi. !î r(,p1i\,'trr. titc L.,r_tt:c ril .,riì.ll rri ge;reliil lrr:l 'nrirtd 'i(9). !). 5.1 5.ì) lììre ;onulu,les thit: "1\Ícst problbl,"-rir., ircÌirt-vpcs o1'naluiai integers tonn the :itit;,iest siluc.rr.ir:ìl llllìciils rut ... (tite coìììÍtì(-)n i-inkito,l'tr corriroritirig i;,ri1i 1,Ìr1.sicisl inrl ps1 uirr:iogisl Ì . . 1!ìar n,arrili:si îhetiit,.:iic; r_rrr tiie tÌri.eslioìd r-,i pcrccpri,i;1." ((()ì, p )lrl iy1 (rr',.ìei ìo er{-plc're turthe;. it rs tirercl-r'irs lìccr:ssrÌ;v to íatillir "ro lltr.
irr,,iiviiiuai nuln'Jers thci,-iucii'es. anti gatlier iogil irer ihe suii.; toral r.;f tirc,ugirt. bcitlr technical anci rììviholo,dirr:ri assertioiis. rvhicli tire1,, irave i:aiied ibrth ir.orn hul-.aniiy n-uri,b ers, iiiriircrnioir ls arr-'ìiet1,oai stnrctur ai cc iisiaiìis of the colieciive iinccrrsciùrìS. possfsS a dl,,rramic. llcir.,c aspec:rl whrcli is espc.:raii1. irirportani to l,eep iri itiinC. ll iS iÌoi w-rì.ìi \!:!r caì) iio y,,iiit nunllrcrs biii what rlli:)'oo io i)'dr consci(lusrtcss that rs esse niial.'" (1.) ), p :1-r i Vc.iii lìrirnz outiines the recuirnmeìiicú pit qr.i;:tirr. as f'ciii-rivs:
''Wìrr.n rve ilke luio tcLìouni iht ìrrdrviriuai cilarat tel.L,c , ,l rì:.,iiliiì lÌillììì.ri.i1 \i,r. clirì :rcillrll_v 'l3tnùit-\tratr. lit:il :.1:er pi,l-lr. (. 1ìtc sailr oiderin!: cíte,rtr il îhc phv-ric:rl anC psichrr, rcainrs. thet''!hciiìo,< apl)fal io Lonstituts tirr.mosl na:,,!ì cuir\t.lnts ùf r..atuie etiltet:ilniÌ rìilttf,ri'ps-vcir0-piiy:rcal relritt-y. iJec:.u,.r, oi tilis ì rvottic .í-)Iìjtciu:t th;ìi titú t-rsi: Of ii:tur* i.iiaiireriia',i..ran:, ;rrr; t)c 1o ariii-J{-'l rìr,:rr' clluiectcrìsti,t\ rna ,ìrrliì).2J. rvlt,:n lror:ìble. t\ei)' i1u!lìL)ri tn tls logìcll reiriiolrsìtir, to lll (jtherr. l-hi: rcserrch shouid bc unc!crrakt:n tn roilal-ror:iriori gith p1q,,,.,.,q,,,. Ìruslelans, ;rrrti psycnotogitls *'ho :1re coltv€rrjiltt u.ìtÌl aîc em, piliaal t:ìrtt\ iii;out lire \tru(jUf:ti !iìírra. tr.l\ti(ìs oi lrurìLrr.i5 jn i difi:rciir rn,:,jtury1 ,." ti9ì, r. j,.i_11 -7.
Number and logic -l .l Ber-onil 2-!erm logic. mu!ti-term s.i':;1€nis
In the above argurnel-rt tire terms ".;et" and "s.!'-olent" have l,.oen used iniercl.a-ngeal-;Ìi' since one of lìti' charat:-terirl-ics oi ihe iets cll' erlenieiitr' under cLjnsideial!llt \\'as icienîiiied ls the contpÌententaiit', of tÌrcir eiernentr. ln discussirrg mull.i-term s).'stenls. a lnatheinatjc;an :rnd dire.:to.r: oÍ'inCustrial re:carih J. G. Benrrett ciarlfiel further tht: kirids oí:ìets to viliich thcsc alqllli irtrìis at:rir/' ((45). vol j. pp .; 10). A set t,f e!etlle;-'is takeri wiihcttÎ reference tcr any internaì t:onnections ls cailed I i:hsr ,1 syrten: is t+ be distinguished flrnt a class, antl he stiggests ruies for iloing so3'"3s. l{is srunnarv cf the.-iiaracterisîics r)f' systims clarifies t-ire deilniti<-'n of the sers consiCeied here (.se; Anner i ì Bennetí notes thai: "1'he i:roperrics ll-svsiems ilre usually studierJ in terms oi their ini.ier contiectedness, but litert is no gcnera! doc'tri,nr: o.f s1,57gvrt baseLÌ tipt;ri the. prc>pertics thírt are assr;cieted. tvith the rutmber ttJ îemts b;i u.,hich they ure crinsîitut<-d. T'lris is strange. for philosophers have alrvai's been cieeph' conc:Erned witl.i the qrrestion whether cìr irot tliere is a ílrnciamer,tal numhrer si'stem in the basrc strtictute uf reaìrt.v." ({45), vol. l, p. 4) !,ìr;ch systems have hor'.'ever alri'a5,'s irad to be sludierl, by using the con','entional trvo-terr;t iogic. "Our usuaì langriage. though fuii of inconsistencies arrd arnbigr.rities, can be aclapteC to the clescrrpticn oi.trvDternr sys{gn13, \\/hen tlie mearrings of v.,ttrtls an,j sent' terices are defirretl rvith specir.rl care, a logic is consÍrttct-ed that turns out to be the la."r'ol two-terrn svsients. . . The iurLriguities lnd incr.rnsisiencler:; of o'.rr olCinary speech are ncit r defcct, and recognitioÍt of ihem is a remir',der tlial e,r,;oeriernce has rnore <lintensions than logic. Anail'tical ancl si;eptical philosopher-s have. duritrg a hundred generatlons, exposed the barrenrress c.l trvoterm thìr-rking, and it beconies neces!ìarv io exa.rn:ne tJre po-rsibilities laîent in higher modes of thought." ((45] , vol. l, p. ll5) in support r:rf tiris investigatiorr Belinott quotes Bertranti Rrrssell on classicai two-tertìl logic:
''''[lie extension of the subjecí-preclicate logìc is right as far as it goes, l-'ut obviously a furlhcr e:itension can be Froved necessery by gv3g{ly sitniiar argurients" How lar it is ner":essaiy to go up tire series of r"hree-term, tbur-terrt, five-terrn reia' tions, I do not know. Bitt it is certainly necessary to gcr beyond (\'io-term relatjrrns."' {45) Bennett Craws a.ttention to the widespread dtralism in thought, feelìrgs and instincr,i.,'L: rea.ction3r' and comntents" as an exart.tirle, on the rliliiculty cif triaCic (ihree-ternr) thinking. "f-onternplation of the triad is not merel-v reccgni:iing a îhird idea as the reconcilialiorr o1' two contradictcries, but ratlier seeing in the union of the three an exemplification of the fundamental reiaticnship by wlich all erperience is governed. So long as nothing more is at work than ihe primitive associating mechanìsm. to speak tlf the 'uniîy of the triad' conveys little meaning. In crder io perceive this unity directly. a power of attention is rec;uired that comes only with a change of consciousness." ((45) . vol. l, p. 26) He nrites Russell's vierv that it appears to be beyond îhe ordinary power of man (47) .rithough clear-I ly bcth Bennett, ancl others beiie're that there is a rvay around ',he ìimitatìon 14:). (48), i49 ).
As an indicatron cí the route to be lollowed, Bennett r:emailis that:
"The C,r\ctrine ol' loglcal types indicaies tlret sorne wr-irds do not refer to terms but trl s-v'steqrs. For erampìe a singlc terrn rnay ha';e qualilies, but it crinnot have relationships. Relationship is t!:t-pr'.-rpertr,r of a sy'sten. and at first sight it migtit seem that arry rnrlti-tr:rrn s1''stem c:in exeinpiii,v relationshiDs. trt can readily be secn '"hat a dyad thar is a two-terrn systemr.arrn<)i ca(rv a reiatiortship . . . {f rclatedness is a propeitj, c,r rìuaÌity lhat beklngs to tirree-term svstelns. fÈe iluestio.n qises whetlier Íhere are other properties that tharo-cteriz.e s,J)Stems \uiÍh dif'fcretit wmtbers o.t' íemts i(45ì. vi:I. :. p. -5-6).
'fhe point to tre emphasi;:e.l as a resuit o1 t1-ta xbr-rve aÍgurncnt is tliai the sets firndamenta! lo !ht: sociol sciet'tces and i:oli,,:y-lòrrnulatùtn cotistltute s.\'st€rns whose tliarar:teristics merit invcstigrstir;n irrespet'!ivc'Lf Ílte nattúe of the ternts iit anlt partk:rtkt t'ase. Namell' a 5-terrn set of vaiues lconceirts. principles. problems etc.) has cl..ararteristir:s distinct from a 7-terin set, iÍfespectìve of the values selected in either case. And. fr.trthermore, tucl! charaL'teristics are solel-v d.ependcn! upon the tota! number cf t?rms in the set.
''l .1 i,ogii: c:I inter-parodigntatíc d.iuktg'.aa ln proposirrg a delilrerately non-western compleurent to the Aristoieiian logic of western science. Kinhide Mr-rshakoji (a9) introduces a thiril pole in the dialogical process to destabiiize îhe intellectrral equiìibrium which exists bet'ween two paradigrns dividing a given intellectual community intn 1'.'o ooposing poles. [{e t}rcn argues. in the iight of (Ìomplementarity in ph-vslcs, that:
"inter'prildigmatrc dislogues noi only in naturaì sciences bui lilso i1 ,ncial scienccs should be cont:etne<! not rvith the detcrminaf,ion c,f rvho is righi or rvrong in detìning a con(ept one wa)' or anorhcr. It shouid rather conr-ertt itself u'itlt lhe oùestion ol v,'lr::t part: of thc rratura.l or scrcial realitres are best apprcach' ei L:; <-.ne r.rr tli: oîhci positicn. Two ibrmally contradictory definitions cf thc realiiiei may be boih rclevant and cca-iplementary rn shedding light or r1iî'furent a:ìpccts of thc same social realities.
'lhis rs wh1, tlto logtc of inter-parudignatic dialogue cannot be br,'und by the laws of Aristotelian fttmal logic: idcntity. contradictir:n and, excluded niddlt: . . . A .eroup thi:oreticai trealmcnî of cotrceots used by a gi'ien paradignr is insutfi,:irnt becruse it dcals only with the strJcture of the sigyúfianf s]'stem (the logicai ievel) without tcuching how the signifté retrliîies (the reality level) are decotnposed when one reli.:s on a glven p:irailigm (.50).
-fhis "logico-reii" problem of lhe relationship between the lcgiccLì and the re:lity level calls for a study of the morphogenesi-. of paladigms. Catastrophe theory helps us here stnce it sheds light on tlie <lifferent logicr'l pcsitions in the morphogenctical space. A-major diiTerence between the two levels of "signifi'tnt" and "signiilé" lics in îhe fact that the fornler is composed b)' discrete concePts rvhile tho la'tter is a continuour; space. 'l'herefore, it beccmes ÌIecessar:J to apply a catastrophe theoretical model relating the continuous reality (i'e. the. "sígnifré') with lhe discrrete set of concepts (i.e. the 'îlgnr-fiant')."
Ilis reference to catastrophe theory, formulai.ed by René Thom (32) , relates this argurnent to that on logicai "curvature" (above). Mrrshakoji Îhen argl-res for a rtonformal logical model developed in oriental logic on the basis of four leminas (affirmation: negationl nrln-affirmation and non-negationl affirmation and negation). Such lemmas are concerned with the modalities according to which the human mind grasps reality rather than how human intellect reasons about it (51) . He considers the lemmic approach to be a breakthrough in view of the possibilities it provides for overcoming the static ontology of the West inherited from Parmenides and highlighting the limitation of means-end rationality Mushakoji's concerns are shared in part by Sallantin (48) and Varela (see above), although they both elaborate on 3-term systems in much greater detail. The relationships between these three is elusive and a broader framewcrk (such as Bennett's) raises questions: (a) of the possibility of 4, 5 or higher term systems, (b) of why the three authors are seemingly insensitive to the qualìtative attributes of systems higher in the series and (c) of the implication for classification.
.3 Number and N-term systems
In order to make further use of the programmes that Bennett and von Franz respectively set themselves, it is necessary to link the concept of N-term system (Bennett) and that of nurnber as studied by von Franz. What these and other authors have each attempted, in one way or another, is to identify the qualitative characteristics to be associated with each term in the series:
one-ness, two-ness, three-ness, etc. or unity, duality, triplicity, etc. or one-term, two-term, three-term, etc. or monad, dyad, triad, etc. or unitary, binary, ternary, etc.
Bennett argues the case as follows: "Even when enfranchised from the limitations of logic, thought does not reach beyond the triad; yet we cannot doubt that four-term, five-term, and even higher systems must be significant . . . Multi-term systems oblìge us, therefore, to take account of the significance of number as a factor in all experience;and for this we must seek a fuller apprehension than is given by logic. The logical interpretation of number derives from the formation of classes, and is essentially polar or dualistic; that is, it consists in the assignment of an object to a given class in terms of the simple distinction of 'yes, it is a member' or 'no, it is not'. This procedure leads to a view of number according to which there is nothing to be known except the laws of arithmetic. These laws belong, however, merely to a primitive form of logical thought." (45) , vol. l, p. 26-l). Sallantin also addressed this point (48) .
Bennett argues that there are several other ways in which we can think about number, such as lead to cardinal or ordinal numbers. In addition the 'arithmetic quality', based on the inner relationships of a group, may be used to distinguish prime and composite numbers, for example. But even so "the full significance of number is far from being exhausted. Numbers have meaning in their own right. The number two is not merely the symbol of duality; 'twoness' depends upon and defines the separation of opposites. The number three is indissolubly connected with the very idea of relatedness. Three as a class concept is an abstraction from ex-perience -three as a relationship is an integral part of experience itseif. This leads us to seek for a property which can be called the concrete significance bf nu.nber." ( (45), vol. 1, p. 28)
Bennett joins von Franz in recognizing that: ..The search for the concrete significance of number is very ancient. . . At some unknown period . . . man had already become convinced of thù concrete significance. and must, therefore, have seen how a nurnb.i.un anta, directly into events as experienced by himself " (p. 2g) And: "If we are ever to free ourselves from the limitations of logical thinking, we shall have to discover a new significance in number; for number and logic. as we know them today, are inseparable." (p. 2g) 8. Comprehension and number
hoblems of comprehension
It is appropriate to note that work in the well_defined field of "multi-valued logic" does not seem to have had any impact on these concerns3?. Nor does that on the "theory of numbers"38. It is only more recently in studies which face up to nonguantitative considera_ tions with propositions for 3 or 4-valued logics that the nature of the link begins to emerge (49) , (49) . The rea_ pn fo1 the lack of progress would appear to be that in both fields named above the problems of comprehen_ sion, and lhe status of the observer, are ignored despite the early efforts of Korzybski on general sernantlcs (5+). It is here that the questions of self-reference (see above) and the wider implications of conrplementarity are now signifi cant in legitimating further investigation 33 (5 5) .
Comprehension may be considered purely as a problem of "pattern recognition" in non-veibal àata. T'his is now receiving considerable attention in some branches of information science concerned with the man-machine interface. It is a quantitative response to complexity and is of limited relevance here (although the illusion that the conventional quantitative mode is neutral and "value-free" is now being widely attacked (56,(57) . A much more subtle problem is associated wìth the com_ prehension of qualities, and as such necessarily involves the oòserver actively to a greater or lesser degree.
The question is how qualitative distinciions can be comprehended and communicated. Clearly the problem does not even become apparent until diffeiences in interpretation create difficulties. Even then it may be disguised by explaining differences as characterisric of different schools of thought, social backgrounds, educational levels, or cultures. The effect of such perceived differences on the medium used to portray thi quality in. question may even be the focus of appreciation, where the preoccupation is primarily aesthetii(painting, music, poetry, etc.), thus again disguising the problem. Where deliberate efforts are made to use words io define the meanings to be conveyed by other words, obvious discrepancies can be resolved whilst subtler ones remain.
Il. wÍgtltic approaches currently explored by COC. TA and INTERCONCEPT (5S) may furìher reduce the problem. Nevertheless, even when the ideal has been achieved of an agreed definition for a qualitative attri-bute (available in a universally understood language), a core problem still remains. The word-ensemble constituting the definition will be comprehended in different ways according to the capacity and inclination of the reader even if the definition triggers a single gestalt perception of the quality rather than a serial perception of its multiple facets. It wouid be naive to expect that the ultimate definition of "beauty", 'Justice" or any other quality could be formulated in 1979 -thus depriving the future of any possibiiity of comprehending, describing or expressing them more appropriately than is now possible. Similarly both a child and an adult may share a verbal definition of "peace" -but their comprehension of it is likely to differ, expecially if one has experienced the realities of war. Further elaboration of a verbal definition does not eliminate the difficulty and is quickly counterpro<1uctive.
The nature of the challenge to comprehension can be illustrated by the simple sequence of numbers: 1,2,3,4, etc .: (a)where I denotes any single entity isolated from its context, no demand on comprehension is made; higher numbers merely provide an arithmetic total. The totality is never more than an aggregate and the relationships between the elements are irreievant. (b)where I is used to denote a totality within which no element has been isolated, then use of higher numbers indicates successive degrees of subdivision of the original totality40. With each higher number the total pattern becomes increasingly difficult to comprehend. (c)where I is used to denote the totality encompassing the universe as experienced, then the comprehension demanded is associated in traditional cultures with a supreme being. Higher numbers then reflect hierarchies of such gods, each governing qualities of an appropriately lower level of abstractionar. (d)where 1 is used to denote the totality encompassing the universe as experienced and including the ex' peiencer, the state or level of consciousness of the observer is necessarily affected. Higher numbers then denote successively more multi-faceted levels of consciousness at increasingly lower levels of abstraction. The locus of this paper is on complete sefs which in some way aim to encompass a structured tr-rtality. These may raise problems of comprehension of type (b), (c) or (d) depending on the level of abstraction of the set elements and the degree of "insulation" nf the observer.
There is currently great faith that when verbal descriptors are used as identifiers for such set elements, they will carry some universally understood meaning (e.g. peace, justice, human rights, development. democracy, etc.). As argued above, and as ongoing investigations are demonstrating (59), (60), this is far from the case. Such fundamental characteristics elude complete or even adequate definition by any particular set of wordsa2. Clearly the definition or label merely points towards a comprehensible experience. It is not the comprehension of that experience. ("The map is not the territory.") 11 8 .2 Comprehension, remembering and mnemonic aids The special problem in comprehending complete sets lies in the relationships between the interdependent elements-These are seldorn explored in any verbal definition, thus detracting from its adequacy. But even if the member elements can be comprehended singly or in groups in serial fashion, remembering them is increasingly difficult anci their relationships are lost as is any grasp of the totality.
It is at this point that various mnemonic aids are used in describing such sets in order to provide some reinforcement to memory. The crudest and most prevalent is a simple numbering of elements. At the other extreme are sophisticated diagrams showing their relationships. Attention has even been drawn to the advantages of interactive computer graphics as an aid to maintaining creative "thinking momentum" and obtaining a grasp of a total patterna3. But as noted in Part I (Section 5), itis the mandala-type representations which constantly stress this mnemonic function. It is the manner in which they are designed to be used which recognizes the challenge to comprehension and causes attention to be focused (as with an optical lens) through the member elements disposed in an appropriate configuration.
Significantly it is from the continent of the mandala that have come papers on the relevance of mnemonics to classification (62), ($)44 .
"The basic idea underlying seminal mnemonics is that concepts of objects or phenomena which are apparently unrelated at the phenomenal level, may be seen to be related to each other at a deeper level of perception. Seminal mnemonics consists of assigning the same notational digits to such "seminally equivalent" concepts, regardless of their verbal denotation or class context. But the perception of seminal equivalence of concepts is a difficult process, and demands a high degree of intuitive ability in the classificationist." ((62), p. l6)
The last sentence and other comments in the paper link back to the discussion of the previous section. But the technique is said to have been used only "intuitively and almost unconsciously" by S. R. Ranganathan in developing the Colon Classification.
8.3
The quagmire of number symbolism: the past As a contrast, those preoccupied with number symbolism over the centuries have been quite deliberate in their attempts at seeking to associate numbers and conceptsas. Such investigations have from time to time been very fashionable, whether from Pythagoras onwards in the Westaó, or in the East, as Ranganathan writes in his holegomeno:
"In the mystic tradition of Chaldea and India, many such equivaiences are believed to have been recognized. Itgives seminal mnemonic significance to letters as well as numerals. A correct knowledge of it will make the use of digits conform with seminal mnemonics. The folgotten tradition needs to be recaptured. As the deep region of seminal equivalences transcends expression in words alone, communication through the written or printed word is difficutt. Seminal equivalences are ineffable, but they get permeated by personal association and communication in a school." (67) But although there have been many investigations and the literature is vast, the result is a veritable quagmire into which many have ventured and from which few have returned unsullied. This is not to deny that many ()f the eminent intellects who have been attfacterl tc, rhis question have not come up rvilh vaiuabìe irrsighrs, brrt rather that it is ncrw difficr:lt to filter the signifir:anr insights írom a rich -s66r1g3stróC rt1'cliliure-troun.-l speculations and outright nonsrnse u,hìch hai'e accunrulated o\ier irìany centurie:;.
The investigations of von lìranz and Bennei.t cf thr' qualitaîive attributr:s of tÌtc sirnplc s)/sterns are there.Íbre to L,e welcorned because they successi,rlly disassociate themselves from number rrr)'siicism in its more unfortunate traditionai forms. Ind*ed, working; indeter,dently. thelr proviCc the necessary complernentary perspecî-ives o, psychoìogist and ph;,sicist which is von Franz's objective lsee abr.r',re). She herseif explores mateiial concerning the fìrst four integers. Bernert arnbitiously' er, plores up to 1l-term sysiemsat -tirus invitilg niisunderstanding. howerier due to the rrvef present problems of comprehension to w'hich he himself drarvs attrntlon.
Tlie natrrre of rhe danger is iiiustrated by his results which are s'tmmarized in ,'\nne-x 2 . Altirough rt is the most systematic and dtsr:iplined atternpt (in the West. at ieast), its rnain weakness liss irr the verbal descriptors. These are really 6i1]y usetil as tentative signposts lacking anl' indicaticln as to hr:vr the referent rs to be experienced. J'he problem, as rvith altr nurnber symbolism in the past, is that it is only too easy for a readei to assume that his own comprehension of the descriptor as defìned is as complete as that rvhich is intended (leaving aside questlons of Bennett's own limitations and ditficr-rlties of comprehension). ,r\.lthough more limitr:d in scope, 'rhe $n.,e reservations must apply to the verbai descriptors of seminaì innemonicso8. This is the basir.: ctrifficulty vrìth verbal descrlptius and their definitions however much etfort (à ta Acadérnie FranEaise) is rnade îo govern tlreir usage and significance. trt is worth considerìng th.e possihilit;r' thai thcse such as Pythagoras were eware of this problem" as weli as of the r:lihers indicated above: ie.'el of comprehension, supetsedirrg dualistic logic, ìhe need for mnernonics. and selfreference (inciudìng the rìistinguisher's relaticnship to the denotative mark'!. What better way could the;v use to emtrody the subtlety of their insights than tlrrorrgh nr;mbers anrj their interplav. specially since the abcve questions arc all nunrher-related'l The use of numbers does at least continrrally i:onfronl eacli irser with his responsibility fnr an,v verba! descriptor.s he chooses to associate {temporaril'y arrC accoritring to circumstance) with the concent Nfore importani, it continualll' challelges hi:n to greater levels of understandinq of that concept and the manner in wh;cir iil relates to others. It also leaves the firtr,rre liee to reinterpiet the concepts in cîher \rays or to gr€ater deprhs a Drocess 'vhich is tull oi pitfalls anri discontinr.rrtie-q when ci-llture-[iound vertra! descriptcrs are nsed as at present.
I{owever numbers are sufficierit irnl}, to ihe very few. They do not provide a corìcrete iniagc fitr those incapable of srrstainerl tiìougJrt at that lev;l oi abstraction. They can hcwever be ieadily associa'red *'t,n ut.1lst.,,pal figures ldi'rinities, etc.) whjch each constitute a iiighly compìex conrLrosite oi qualities comprehensible as a 12 whoìe at rnany lcvels of undersfanding arrtl accorCing to abiiity (91. Such figures af,i cheracteristic of mziny' cultr,ires Íbr rvhtch tbetr narure i-s porverfulli, clarified by niarv vivid tales arr,l inylhs corrcerning their relationsftips. Their vr,rlue lios in their abrlity.to ciaii{y or intensiíf ideas or emotioits tlrrough appeal to sense experien"-e. By sucl"r sf ilrhols. "i'\e abstraci ma./ be hrought into the ir:a.ln oi the ccrncrete, wliere it is in.rmediatei.y recognìz-ai;ie and rne:rningful" ((66ì. p. vii) Arrd indeed sîuciies of tbe sy'niboiicr ;rature lf rnedievai thi-rught and ex1.:ressiorr "'reveal iri ihe metirevai rnrnd a weblike strr,rcîure cf abstract ideas and concrete realities s,r cìosei'y inlerrvoven and interdeprqnllant tlìa1 no serious eap was felt io r'xjsi. hetrvcen thcrn." ((66), p. vii) 8. 4 The quagrnire oi'number.svnbrilism: tlte past rest$gent l'his is cf course essenîìaliy a sympathetic assessmerit aird it cannot be denied lhat much thaî was prod.ucerj withìn this coiltext, if not most, now apperis at best as fascinating norìsense but this is a prerlictable consequence oi using the culture-bound verbai descriptors of interpreters feeding endlesslll on one another's procucrts. But it would be a great rnìstake tc trelie";e i-hat niodein socieiy has compietely resolved tlie issues to rvhich number syrnbolisin responded.
On thc one hand verlr' malr.r' sclioiariy or administrativc papers novr' enllmerate lists of fundamentai issues. principles, values. problems, etc. (to be compared with the meciieval predilectìcn for N virtues. srns, nrinciples. etc.) as discussed, It is then the task of tlie classifìer to prescrihr: sone meaningful order. But for various reasons, society rrow faces a crisis of rneanirrg r,vhich the plethora of'str.rdres is instrumenta.l in aggra. vating rather thari alleviating. ,,\nd. Cespite the ei forts of classif iers (who lllernselves have various preferences for nrrmber-governed ordering s1'sterns). such studies iend to ;rchieve quicker oblivjo;r 'rlran tt:trrir medieval ccunterparts. and ale jr.rst as meaningless to the uninitlated. Meaningful synthesis is rare an<l of lirnited relevance to societal problen-ls. Comprehension and integration tend to rcsult inspile of currcnt enumerations and classificatioas and nr:t trecause of iliern.
On the otiier hanci, in al effort to render meaningfr-rl the naiure oi the complex issues which fare ro6ig{r7 and the importance of the values by rvhich changes should be guided, governrnent agencies, social-change movements and educational authorities are no-v/ obliged to rescrt to synlbois which can tre satisirctorill, ct,mrnurricated through the available ttediaoe.
Ihis reqr-rires that suclr syrnbols i;e easily oomprehensible. i'oherent. and tlrat they bear oniy a srnrple rneaning (irrespective oi the courplexity of the i-ssue). Because of the iow status of "pubìic relations", such rymbols are on11, indircrc:tly linked to the weakjv nrdered substantive ite:ris enumeratecl in agericy programmes or in th,c scholarly studies on which they nray. be based. Where compiex iibstracl notions must be comrnunicated (e.g. concerning ecolog!r:ai systems). cartoon .,nersonaliiies" are often usr:ci, aDDropriiircly arialltecl to each cul- ture. Wcri: it n"'cessaiy tc rrrirotì! tÌìe citars(ì,"erlsiir:s oi justicc, bcautl , ìovt:. eic. v,,hici' rv.:l'g r llirlcljirtlpalltn of the past. it is nct unlikeìy'that pubiic relations wrl'.lid need to resort t(i syntb<rls oÍ' upLlate,i vers;onri of Ihe superliun:air beings on whieir iil.rt petic-'C so sicl"ssfulìi projectecì its belieis. (As ir is" caltoi,)t cltar;cters lrtd fiint stars ,ietìne the iiniis r:i'our s,,ilitlet;' ) irr'erc it cttnsidered oecessafy to shoiv tirc relationsl-lì1:rs Deiweeti ihe concerns oi ihc diiferer,i {lniieC Naiirrlrs aÉiencles (t.tj. etlucaiion. justiie, igrtt:uìtutc, Iiealth. etc.), it is nr;t rrniikely that public reiatiolts wor.iki iiave l:,r res,.)r'. io an inteipiay cf sucir persr.rnalized sytrthoi: iri a ri'rt;tjern series oi "iÌ))'tirs". 1'h,.' quaglirire ol the past has not been avoideci. ii is ir pìocess oi be;rrg rE-cvchtci. bticaltsc the probic-ms lrcn: wirich 1t afisc:; irar'--nr)t beett recog' nizeC. whi,;fL eifec';rveiy consti:uted a !)efrrìsIlenl sysîerq oÎ l'ìlins locatiols witether based oi' a buiiding. a tùwr1. or a set of divinitìess 1. Orrto these tìrtr user "ilnpressed" images (imagtircs ugefiles, ' corporeai sin":,llitucics") which rvouìd irìgger acccss to ihe tlì:nBs <ir itii'as to'o" remembered a techrriqrjs remtnisceni of thal <iesi:r-ibecì by mcrnor-y and calcuiating prcrciigie; tn IcÙcnt,!'e3rs. li is some'rvhit rii5(:úrì.-e11iilg tiat tiris iost :iIt pernir.teci its exponerrts io rlse o-,'ei 1C0.C0C filing locatiorrs (p. 120) antì î-i'r:lt t'iìrjse ;r;.iici l-,e expitii:ii irr any sequertce. The inrportance crf tne ait iirr oratcrs. scliciais. limirttstrators, meriha;its, etc. is;ieat at a tìine when rexi r'i,-production ilas iiiilicult arld papet e.xpenslve. What is eveÍ Ìnoiî Cisturbing is rha" uilii the R:rrniri educational reft-rrnt in the i6th celliirq,/. trld ilrcreasi:lg reliance orr the piinterl ntediurn. it is t:ir,ar ltc'i' iht sr-eis were so\\'n fbr tlie prl-rbìerils artj cti:hoti,rtiri' r.lelrtificil irr the previoi is se.! iott.'l'his rel.'llrn exl;i rr:i,' iv rc jsc ted ( ict' religious reasons) the use uf mentoty ':Ligg:ring iiri;.rg'". which seetn to have been essciriii'il ro the ari, itì f'a\'atir of the present aplri()Jciì alì0 its as:;octaf ei ftrriri:; iif ciassification. Menrory is riou' consicieiîri es :i "rn.:chaiiii:aì"' facility oniy to be tesied dilrin;4 e:;rtritilìi:rioil.i airij r:ilierwise to be enhanced by ilate l,.a;iks prccesslrig lri-o;itilttion in serial order. Whilst rt would be foolish tL' der',' lhe nced fo: the reform, it seems clear ihat this cut off s<.rrne lincs oi irvestigation which could have proved fruitfui (irrespective of the "nonsense" froni which it is difficult to iiis-13 erltangie thenr). Desprlls the subsequent interest in nì€nrory of Bacon-l)escartes and Leitirriz, it does appear tlia.t insights r.vere lost (ol tiriven uíici€tground,) with the rejection of the highi;v clrrì1piex mel;r;ry systems deveìoped by Rayrnond Luil, Giordanc Bruno and llobert Fluiid. Althcrrgh Yates acknorvìedges ttrat. witl-i the availabie information. theji full scope eludes hei, she nialies it clear that ihey at ieest had rÌrore or le"qs €x-plicit concerris icr: r-rrainta írr in g i lie indivi,i ue l's e nc.y c' I o pu e d ic r e is t i c tr,-.lltry to tlie se paraie calegories of l.-nt-,wle,ige iiiscoveririg belter wrys of titting or pat.:king sucl'r knowledge iiito memr:ry, crf iefiectmg ihe worid in nìelno ry imtrxoving seirsii-ir,ity' to îhe possibie syslelns ú pdtterns of relalionships bi:lvseen sucÌr catcgories of k;-rorvlerige. ileveioprng elrpreci3tiorì cf tyrc qualir,tiive aspccts cf knowieCge discovei'ing rnethods ibi the orgalric ittiiiicuiít,n rif /;no*ledge in rnerno.r"y' and understanúir-rg iritelsif,u-ing al<i ib,:usilis tiie rndiviciuai's expcsure ic kriowí<.jge as ù meeiìs r-'f pru'roking a benefìcial thanrc in levcl rsf awcreness. Ail ol' tiresc íjtlacir .ÍnuciÌ gre.rier irnporiance tu the s'ratus ;f the "ot.iserver" thri, oir-i thc sribseriuerrr clereì-cpfr€rrt cf the "obiective" :,cicntrfìc rretiiod. lt is only lr recelí years ihat the ccirsequerice of negelctirrg such colÌcerns iras becorie al-".psrent in sooirrry's irlabiiit)r io coinprehenrj. and irniiage change. il the iight of its eiu:;ive values and probierns (cí. i:i.enaissarrce '\'irtues" and "vices''.;, in order to facili'rare meaninglil trirriran deveicpnrcnt (J:)).
!.6 Àuginent ecl com,ltrehet slr.trt Havirg erssernbled inuch evidenr:e, Yates bequeatlies tr) oîhers tl',e probiem r-lf wiietherr the il"er,aissr.rnce did in fact possess a secret rremor.v technique l'oi stirnr-rìatritg the hurnan psyche tr.; ii widcr ;alige cf'creative achievelnent thin ever i,retore (p. 35.1). That the ciescribed tecirniques cìainr to piovoke rnen:rúrv tc retain the inteireiiitiorisirip between inany eielfleris in a wìroie partcrn is ciear. That this invc'ìved a pre()ccupatrorr witir cor,rzpíeie cnd ctydered sels in aiso c:lear. as is Íhe,i'relatioÈ-srrip tcr iiutnber iin ther iigi-rr oi vr;rr Fran-z's rertiew of the sairte aLìthcrs) Propiirticn, hannony urd cuniiexio:r iri ilre represtttaiort of su,:h sets are considered vitai trl srrccess in empciv,;riirg this rrew ccrnprehe:tsit'!' grdsp wliich is ooiìsequerrtiy intirnaicli' rciated to arl.istlc e;ipresriion : poei r:,,. paiutiirg. niusic, arcliitecir.l ía, thcai.rr s 2. Current research orr coÍÌ-ipriter arigcreritati<ln of inrerllect iacks iiLis ar''iistic cirnensìon alihc;uph it filcililatcs manipi.rlati<.xi of categr,rlls5 {6fr). 'I'lie r-'oircarrì witir ptrscri:iìl-v lneaningfui vivid irirage-4"' is echoed in le i:ent stuilies oi s)zmbr-rls as signs charged uvith rneai:rng (70), illi, (-l)). Tc exert their psyciroil rramic organlzirrg effect sucir s-vrnbois prr-iuppose honrogerreity aî signí!îant ar;,J signilié ((7ii), p )0-21). 'Mrether and hcw, sucl, "cirargiiig"'can be accornpiished ;i: presirrnably the key to tiie quesrrori. Mircea Eliacie has sfu,,ired a orimi'irve ag-'proach to tiris (73) . Contemporary interest is reflected in research on altered states of consciousness (7 4), and psyctrotronic research (75) although the process by which advertising and propaganda impart significance to isolated commercial or political signs is also of great importance. Other factors, such as iconicity, merit attentions3. But for the special significance of the configuration approach characteristic of the Renaissance representation of sets of categories-cum-symbois, insight can perhaps best be gained from contemporary use of the mandala as mentioned above (38) . This preoccupation has been absent from western thinking until the work of Jung -it was with the rotae of Lull, Bruno and company that development ceased. The technique must therefore have aimed to dissoive the dichotomy identified in the previous section, and to move beyond the neatly discipiined relationships of the concept triangle to a condition in which the "uninsuiated" observer was impelled to move, change or create by exposure to symbols. That information no longer moves people to act, is a major preoccupation of those attempting to mobilize resources against world problems (76) . The perspectives that Yates opens up suggests that the "quagmire" discussed above may conceal some valuable insights.
8.7 Convergence of concept triangle elements: a limiting condition Given the preceding remarks, the question is whether anything useful can be obtained from the vast amount of material available on number symbolism in its different forms (see (9) ). The answer would seem to be positive in the light of von Franz's approach. But there is an immediate problem of how to handle the subtle differences between authors and the way attribute sets are shuffled into new confìgurations. As noted by Varela above, the distinctions selected are as much a description of the author as of the subject matter. This question has been studied by W. T. Jones (17) . It would seem that authors can get caught in a subtle trap which does not deny the significance of their insights but rather limits the sectors of society (or period) within which their interpretations can be fully communicated and for which they will be valid and socially significant.
Aside from refining methods for sifting and testing complete sets, their relationship to one another must be clarified. This may be alluded to in terms of their relationship to sets of progressively greater "generality", here-and-now "concreteness" or "inclusiveness"s4,ss. There is a qualitative convergence but its nature necessarily escapes verbal delimitations6. It is a chalienge to the comprehension of the observer and ultimately to the knower-known dichotomy. And, furthermore, whenever "fundamental" sets must be produced, they can only constitute aspects of a more fundamentally integrated understanding which must necessarily emerge progressively if future society is not to be deprived of all possibility of creative insight in this dornain -to say nothing of any more mature insights on the part of the author. Cleady only the future can progressively identify and give content to more fundamental sets. Closure 't4 cannot be assumed -or, if comprehended, then not communicated. Closure in this domain cannot even be premature; it is impossible with maturing individuals in an evolving society (except for strictly limited purposes which carry the seeds of their own mortality). Any attempt at closure therefore merely sets the stage for production of "improved" versions, with all the resultant non-rationai dynamics between the advocates of each and ttre hiatus as one version replaces another.
It is the argument of this paper that in such c<lmplete sets of a giv'en number of elements, the latter are characferized by a qualitative pattern independent of the nature of the set elements. And as the set becomes more fundamental this qualitative chaiacteristic predominates. For, as such sets become more fundamental or general, the characteristics ol the elements (labelled by words) are increasingly afiècted (in their significance to the observer) by the semantic fieid ass<lciated with the numóers (whether explicit or implicit) characteristic of the representation of a given set. The label words iherefore introduce increasing confusion, since the degree of precision they are expected to carry is severely eroded in comprehension by a cloud of polysemantic associations that are progressively more irrelevant to the elements distinguished. And, the more fundamental the set, the more probable it is that the numbers characteristic of the representation would more effectively labei the set eìements which in any case increasingly approximate the semantic fields of the numbers embodied in the representationst. There is in fact a convergence or melding of the elements of the "concept triangle" (word, meaning, referent) with the observer, who is necessarily incorporateci into the referent by the set, if it is fundamental. The 4 terms form a "concept tetrahedron"s8. Recent work has shown the link between the status of the observer and information systems viewed in the light of relativity theory (8 l) .
This recalls Spencer Brown's point cited above that "We see now that the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only interchangeable, but, in the form. identicai." ((18), p 76) This is ciearly however a lirniting condition and for less fundamental sets iCentity is necessarily not assumed, particularly since it is not experienceds e.
Even though the limiting condition may be ignored, the fundamental sets of interesr here are sufficiently close to it, that any use of words must be viewed with great caution60. What the words attempt to labei is better coded by numbers with their qualitative associations. Differences in formulation of fundamentai sets arise because each assumes it is containing fundamental elements but is effectively only containing those evident from an aspect of an even more fundamental domain (e.g. associated with a particular nurneric quality). And each tends to focus on different aspects without being able to incorporate others even if the formulator is aware of them. At this level, hovrever, there is a high degree of isomorphisnr between the numeric qualities characteristic of the sets centred on different aspects. This may be used to clarify the content of sets, and to identify more fundamental sets, without relying too heavily on the words used to carry meaning in any particular case.
9. Qualitative characteristics of sets
l. Characteristics ot' multi-term systems
The remarks of the previous section provide a context within whìch efforts at establishing the characteristics of multi-term systems can be considered as defined in Annex I . This questiori cannot be explored here. lt serves as an indication only therefore, that the results of J. G. Bennett's exercise are summarized in Annex 2. This suffers from the disadvantage of not establishing explicit links to the rich variet-v of cultural and mathematical material reviewed b), von Franz in her study of the first four integers. Such material should be used to interpret and broaden the meanings, otherwise Bennett's (or any other) particular orientation is too easily assumed to exhaust the rneaning associated with each system thus subjectirrg the approach to the difficuities raised in the previous sections.
Bennett points out that "no one system taken alone can exemplify the organized complexity of real structures. We usually need to take more than one system into account in order to gain the insights needed for understanding any existing structure that we find. Accorciing to the aspect of structure that happens to be relevant to a given ?urpose, a system of one order rnay be more useful than another." ((45), vol. 3,p.l1-i2). Aiso (bearing in mind the iimited value of label words fbr the system attributes identified in Annex l):
"The series of multi-term systems is a progression such that each system implies all the earlier ones and requires those that foliow. We cannot understand the triad unless we already group the notions of universality and complementarity, and the dynamism of the triad is not realized without the activity of the tetrad. The later systelns are not only more complex and more highly organized than the earlier ones; they embody an understanding of reality that is more comprehensive and practical. The progression is from abstractness to concreteness." ((45), vol.3, p. l2).
But: "Not all structures exemplify all stages of the progression to the same degree. A given structure may exemplify one attribute strongly and others weakly. . . . One other general property of systents remains to be considered. This we shall refer to as term-adequacy. If the terms of a system cannot be clearly discerned in a given structure, the required characters will be lacking and the system in question is then inadequately represented." ((a5), vol. 3, p. 13). Namely the set is weak in that attribute. In the light of this argurnent, attempts should be made to explore a 3-term set re-interpreted as a 4-term system or more, particularly in the case. of fundamental sets. In Bennett's study of systematicso', he iinds that: "for purposesof practical utility, the systems fall naturally in groups of four. The first four from the monad
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(1-term) to the tetrad (4-term) help us to see ftow structures work. The systems frcrn pentad (5-term) to octad (8-term) show why they work and how they enter into the pattern of reality. The third group from the ennead (9-term) to the dodecad (12-term) is mainly concerned with the harmctny of structures: that is, the conditions that enable them to fuifill thier destined purpose." ((45), vol.3, p. 12)
Clarification of specific sets
Two procedures are outlined (in Annex 3) for the clarification of rnaterial on complete sets. Both procedures ensure that any given set is embedded in a context. In the first case, this is in relation to aiternative (or more superficial) possibilities. ln the second, it is in relation to more fundamental possibilities.
By such procedures the set is being tested and refined in a manner which should establish the constraints on its meaningfulness and communicability to those who in contrast to its vigorous advocates may be sensitive to other aspects of the context in which it is embedded62. The procedures necessarily highlight the extrernely limited value of dependence on the univocal, unambiguous meaning of any worcis (in definitions) used to label such sets or their elements.
It should be stressed that, in contrast to the usual competitive preoccupation, the concern is not with establishing any particular set as the most vaiid. Rather it is to give some understanding of the probability that any such set will be advocated, perceived as valid, or wideiy comprehended and communicated. At the same time it supplies a context for elucidating the meaning underlying whatever marks (words, numbers, codes, etc.) are used to identify a set and its elements.
Representation of multi-term sets
l0.l The above sections have identified: the constraints on set formulation imposed by number: the importance for comprehensibility of representation in 3 dimensions; the irnpact of particular number choices on the consciousness of those exposed to such sets;the problems of comprehension and the role of memory; and the properties exemplied by sets of a given number of terms. These are brought into focus by the problems of representing and comprehending muiti-term sets. The problems have been strongly emphasized. Even a brief perusal of Annex 2 makes it ciear that a verbal explanation in linear text form dos not come near capturing the gestalt quality of most of the systems identified. Just as when the elements of a set are listed, Ihe sequential presentation introciuces the time dimension to an extent determined by the number of terms. Von Franz notes:
"Detailed investigation revealed, however, that number, understood as a psycho-physical motion-pattern, is intimately connected with the problem of time" ((9), p 235). The linear scanning required is not consistent with holistic aspects to the set as a whole is lclst63 ' 10.2 It is for such reasons that Bennett, in his presen' ,tation of the systems in Annex 2, relies heavily on 2-di' mensional diagrams with a high degree of symmetry. And indeed many complex structures are open to comprehension if they have a high degree of synl'netry (82) . The emergence of symmetry in science is also frequently considered an indicator of the adequacl' of a description' As Rudolf Arnheirn notes:
"In a broacler sense, syilrmetry is but a speciai case of fittingness, the rnutual completion obtained by the matching of things that add up to a well-organized whole" (21), p. 64 65) . Symmetry has the special merit of enabling the mind to regenerate constantly those aspects of a pattern which fade fron-r comprehension when they are not the fccus of attentiona3. It ìs in part for these reasons that asymmetric diagrams are seldom used for these purposes. Lack of symmetry lin-rits the comprehensibility of conventional concept maps (83)" Figs. I 3 are thus interesting examples of "representational classification".
10.3
Given that syrnmetry is richer in 3 dimensions and that representation is then naturally more compact, the basic question still remains whether such packing of 3-dimensional structures should bear any isomorphic relationship to the manner in which concepts are "packed" in comprehension. Is it irrelevant that the geometry of such packing is fundamental to so many natural structures in the environment and to the design of artefacts? The argument may be made that concepts require an N-dimensional space as Rene Thom would seem to imply (see above)
. And yet he himself recoglizes isomorphisrn between natural and social systems3o. And it is those very same natural systems requiring an "infinitedimensional space" which are so elegantly and symmetrically ordered (to one perception) in relatively simple 3-dimensional arrays (84) (131). Agreed, the N-dimensional space is required to order transformntions and conflicts between such structures. But it would seem to be highly probable (particularly in the light of the ordering role of number) that there be a certain degree of isomorphism with "concept packing", at least in 3 dimensions and if only with regard to the iconicity of representations3l'6a (The very interesting question, of whether Thom's N-dimensional space can reflect the transformations and conflicts between such structures, namely the social dynamics of ideas and the organizations based upon them, is not an immediate concern here.) 10. 4 Bennett, in presenting his schema (see Annex 2), makes use of several different 2 and 3-dimensional diagra$s to symbolize a system of a given number of terms. He does this to bring out different qualitative aspects of the system in question. This suggests a much more general approach to the problem of representation using work in graph theory (see Annex 4) 10.5 Although the graph theory convention ofpoints and lines may only be meaningfully representative to a segment of the population in western culturesós, it is possible that symrnetric patterns and solids are much more widely acceptable. Whatever the case, such structures may be used to order or classify the elements of a meaningful representation which could (and does traditionally) employ other forms and media, e.g. animation6, dance6?, drama, ritual, music ( (90)- (95)). Part of the general inability to perceive such underlying structures lies in the widespread "vizual illiteracy" discussed by Arnheim ((2i), p. 294 315) -although "structural illiteracy" draws attention to an even more neglected aspects of it. (It is likely that there is a whole series of unrecognized configurative classificatory "handicaps" equivalent to zuch "hidden" disabilities as dyslexia, discalcula, arhythmy, etc). 10.6 There is also good ground for arguing with Fuller (l) that ideal forms such as polyhedra conceal a basic design problem which must be solved to obtain a rnore complete representation in concrete reality. He does this by generating dynamically stable "tensegrity structures" each based directly on a given polyhedral formou (96) . In this design problem and its solution may well lie the clue to the limited utility of ideal forms for representation, comprehension and (above all) effective implementation. For this reason, the author has explored the possibility of using tensegrity structures as a basis for new approaches to the representation of concept and problem complexes, and the creation of new kinds of organization (91, 102) . Clearly this is relevant to the representation of the sets of interest here (98, 99, l0l ).
10.7 The above procedures result in the generation of a multitude of symbols which may be enrichened in various ways(e.g. colour coding, etc). The question arises as to whether this multiplicity is not undermining the original objective of representing and communicating the governing central concepts -particularly since it is what already characterizes the representations of sets of various kinds. However, in remarking on the apparent divergencies of representation between traditional cultures, von Franz states: "In this field, too, knowledge of the part played by the psychic unconscious in the formation of the concept is lacking. Of the archetypes of the collective unconscious w€ know that they -like a crystal lattice in the mother liquid -form structural dispositions in the unconscious, invariable in themselves, although their pictorial and representational appearance in human consciou sness exhibits variations. Behind the se variations lies a basic archetypal pattern that can be descriptively reconstructed." (9), p. 3l-2). Tucci effectively makes the same point in explaining how different users benefit from different kinds of mandalas to arrive at the same understanding: "Hence, as the ritual is adapted to individual adepts, the mandalas are very great in number. In some of the Tantras of the Yogatantra class they can be counted in hundreds" ((38), p. 80). There is a great deal to be said for adapting symbols and representations to the user, rather than imposing a "standard" pattern.
But the point is that these divergent forms, and those arising from the procedures above, are generated by rules governed by numbers. The variations emerge from a general pattern or number field which we are slowly coming to understand (e.g. von Franz has a chapter on "Archetypes and numbers as 'fields' of unfolding rhythmicaÌ sequences" in which she grapples with the question).
I l. Implications 11.1 The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the importance of number in the complete sets fundamental to social science and policy formulation. It is fairlv obvious that formulation of a 2-term set of concepti (va_ lues, problems, etc.) establishes a dynamic for thì advo_ cates of each term, or those involved in any institutio_ nalization of the dyad namely a dynamic having any o.r all such aspects as: active/passive, right/wrong, *rl they, dominant/subordinate, conflict, complementarity. For example:
"By the very nature of scientific logic which is binary, intellec.
tL'als tend-to form bi-polar structures with two opposed camps rallied under two paradigmatic banners. The polaìtation oftèn takes place even within each of the two polesìvhich then clivide themselves into subpoles, and so on, and so forth" (49) .
It is equally, obvious that promulgation of a l_term set (e.g. the problem, the value, the method, etc) gives rise to another kind of dynamic. It is however less obvious what kinds of dynamics tend to arise from sets with a larger number of terms. yet sets with larger numbers are frequently produced and usually it is òonsidered convenient to ignore how the elements of the set interact at the conceptual level or through organizations (depart_ ments, programmes, laws, information systems, etc) on implementation. This paper implies that, like it or not, certain interaction qualities are built in by the choice of the number of set elemenls. If ignored, they will erode or completely undermine the effectiveness oi any action based upon them. They define the problem to which the initiative is vulnerable and by which it will be counreracr_ ed, or nullified. 11.2 Implicit sets of a given number of terms uzually engender particular styles of debate. For example: l-term, promulgation and propaganda; 2-term, proand con argument as in some legal. parliamentary and scholarly arenas; 3-term, mediatory ànd reconciliatory debate. Given that issues currently exceed the capabilities of such forms of debate or are exacerbated by them, other higher-term forms may be envisaged to contain and facilitate the interactions between i greater number of distinct viewpoints. This would also be relevant to the interactions within interdisciplinary teams and the design of the classification systems which serve them (9g). A sense of issae configuration would stabilize under_ standing of the complete sets of ..logically incompatible" problems which such teams are increasingly obiiged to confront. This could lead to the emergenòe of methods based, on anon-dualistic complementorlry. e, need for an improved approach is becoming evident (132), even in unex-pected places: "The mosaic theory of intelligence has focused attention on collection, the gathering to_ gether of. as many pieces as possible for the analyit to work with. A more psychologically oriented view would direct our concern to problems of analysis, and especially to the importance of mental modeis that determine what we collect and how we perceive and interpret thì collected data. . there are important implications for the management of intelligence resources" (133) .
11.3 Research on complete sets is required to clarifv their nature and variety. Complementary approaches include: research on number, as advocated by von Frarz; research on symbols in traditional cultures, of any wellordered sets and their elements; and research on modern sets elaborated in scholarly and action-oriented texts. This should lead to better understanding of: (a) how sets can be formed and their elements classified, (b) how the relationships between their elementscan be rendered com_ prehensible, (c) how the nature and value of higher term sets can be demonstrated, and (d) the nature ofthe tota_ lity,they are intended to encompass. It is in the East that qualities and attributeshave been so carefully distinguished and ordered, whereas sophisticated number_based frameworks have been elaborated in the West. This research should bring out the points of contact. An excellent point of departure would be the problems of ..classifying" tones in music as explored in two complementary studies by _a philosopher (134) and a musicologist (135) faced with the challenge of the alternative patterning possibi_ lities within the Rg Veda: ,.Rg Vedic man, like his Greek counterparts, knew himself to be the organizer of the (musical) scale. and he cherished the multitude of possibilities open to him too much to freeze himself into one dogmatic posture. His language keeps alive that "openness" to alternatives, yet it avoids intrapment in anarchy." (134, p. 31) This appears to amounr to a degree of order beyond that attained in classification today; the flexibility and the challenge to musical creativity are illustrated by Fig.4 . It is perhaps no accident that P A Heelan's work on the logic of chinging classificatory frameworks (139) cites the Rg Vedic example and is considered of fundamental importance by thèse two authorse.
I1.4 tt is not recognized, when advocating or lmpos_ ing the use oI particular sets (e.g. of values. neeas. Étc.), that these effectively compete as functional substitutes in traditional societies for other sets of qualities represent_ ed by hierarchies of gods or spiritual beings governing those qualities (or some of them). The fundamental sets society now attempts to generate are indeed designed to pertorm many o[ the regulatory functions previoitsly ascribed to supernatural beings or potenciés. Given the relative rapidity with which such sèts are now formulat_ ed -compared to the long cultural refinement of a pantheon it is not surprising if they are viewed as superficial, "bloodless" and unrelated to the cultural refinement of the traditional sets. These are so meanlng_ fully represented (with nested levels of interpretatron) through richly decorated beings and memorible tales exemplifying their relationships -to the point that the quality and its representation are difficulfto distinsuish in a particular culture. The lack of success of public information programmes of national and internàtional agencies, in substituting modern intellectualized versrons (of. somewhat ersatz quality) using product marketing techniques, is understandable. The new versions lacl credibility and durability even if the traditional versions afe destroyed by the process6e'70. 1 1.5 Comprehension of the qualitative characteristics encompassed by hrgher-term sets has been shown to be no easy matter despite their vital importance for a more adequate grasp of our current social crisisTr . Problems of classification, comprehension, memory aids and represen' tation need to be considered together. There is every indication that conventional methods do not have an adequate degree of complexity to embody, and reflect for comprehension, the complexity of multi-term systems72,ts. Research is required: (a) on the generation of iconic symbol sets of high mnemonic value, (b) on the consequence of disposing them in configurations so that the pattern of relationships may be comprehended as a whole, and (c) on any paradigm shift or change of awareness which this may facilitate. There is no reason why this should not include an investigation of the traditional memory technique and its intimate relationship to classification systemsTa. To what extent were traditional symbol ssystems, or associated numbers, successfully used for their powerful mnemonic vaiue?
11.6 Intriguing lines of investigation emerge from recognition of the intimate relationship between brain operation and classification. Varela notes:
"the contents of our reality are truly a reflection of the recursive biological and cognitive computations, in contradistinction to the more conunonsense view that our knowledge is a map of the out-there. From this point of view, there is more a construction than a map. These are tantaÌizing possibilities for a cross-connection between episfemology and science, for the design of knowledge representation systems, and for management and societal problems." (106) ?s. This is related to current investigations of the transformation of the categories of conscious experience associated rvith shifts in characteristic EEG frequencies. For example. it is suggested that: "the felt shift and the reorganization of conscious experience is a multi-level phenomenon, involving a reorganuation of concepts, a choice of principles consistent with these concepts. . . as well as the appropriate reorganization of all lower levels of the hierarchy consistent with these changes . . . . The transformation, then, is not merely a reorganization, but at a deeper level is a re-creation" (10T16. EEG data may even provide a link between characteristic frequencies (1 -3, 4 -J, 8 l2Hz),the preferencesmentioned in Part I for sets of a given number of elements, the ability to comprehend them, as well as the quality of that comprehension. A better understanding of the conventional separation of subject and object can be obtained by exploring, as does R. Fischer, ecstatic and meditative states in which "the separateness of object and subject gradually disappears and their interaction becomes the principal content of the experience. . . meaning is "meaningful" only at that level of arousal at which it is experienced, and every experience has its state-bound meaning" (136) . Relevant to the "concept triangle" question (see Part II and Fig. 5 ), Fischer in a section on "sign-symbol-meaning transformations", discusses evidence of the ,tranSormation of sign to symbol in the visual realm
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"where the constancies of space and time are replaced by geometric-ornamental-rhythmic structures", namely hallucinatory form constants. These are visible metaphors, otherwise uncommunicable, within a structure of symbolic logic and language whose non-visual equivalents also govern the order of poetic and musical rhythm in such experiences. Once again the importance of number becomes apparent. This question is set in a wider framework in studies initiated by Erich Jantsch' (137, 138) , to which the argument of this paper links at points too numerous to mention here. 1 1.7 This paper attempts to show the basic role of number and configuration in overcoming limitations to man's ability to perceive (and denote through classification schemes) the patterns which affect him and in which he is embedded. Biologist Gregory Bateson's central thesis is:
"The pattern which connects is a metapattern. It is a pattern of patterns. It is that metapattern which defines the vast generalization that indeed it is patterns which connect" (112, p. I l). He asks: "How is logic, the classical procedure for making chains of ideas, related to an outside world of things an creatures, parts and wholes? Do ideas really occur in chains, or is this lineal structure imposed upon them by scholars and philosophers? How is this world of logic, which eschews "circular argument", related to a world in which circular trains of causation are the rule rather than the exception?. . . we shall see as every schoolboy ought to know that logic is precisely unable to deal with recursive circuits without generating paradox, and that quantities are precisely not the stuff of complex communicating systems" (p. the phenomena of biological organization and human interaction". it is through study of number-governed qualitative conlìgurations that responses to Kelley's related questions should be sought: "And the ultirnate question is, what nature ofpattem or system ofpattenls will enable the human mirrd to retain familiarity with the maximum number of patterns? And what is the rnaximum number of patterns the human minC can hold if the patterns are of this type'l What other attributes of patterns are conducive to greater retention by the mind?" (41) . Finally, how is this related to the level of awareness or maturrty of the observ er'l (107)11 .18 I 1.8 The ability of the mind to retain elements of information long enough for it to form rnemorable patterns with other elements (e.g. of the set) can be enhanced by the use of mnemonic alds. Whilst these may be viewed with disdain by those familiar with the subject matter, it must be recognized that classification schemes are not memorable to the uninitiated (e.g. the public, its representatives and those from other disciplines) who ultimately determine through the democratic process whehter resources will be allocated to the maters ordered by such schemes. The same applies with regard to any argument presented in a linear sequence in an article or book.Thereisa strong case for interrelating the points made in a nonJinear presentation. This goes beyond the seminal mnemonic serial structure described by Neelemeghan (63)" .Furthermore, in view of the increasing resistance to written arguments of any length there is a case for investigating the possibility for their partial replacement by mnemonically structr'.ed diagrams which may provide the detailed pattern for dramatized portrayal necessary for communication to a wider audience. Three dimensional centred mnemonic structures may offer possibilities for memory reinforcement and comprehension beyond those of the two dimensional variety. I 1.9 ln considering contemporary efforts in the West to allocate qualities and attributes to multi-term systems8o one ìr particularly struck by the "bloodless" nature of the resulting categories (however innovative the exercise, such as in the case of Bennett). Such frameworks are generally conceived as mutually exclusive, the advocates of each ignoring the others in favour of their own particular slant on reality. There is much misplaced confidence in the ability of words to label qualitative concepts without ambiguityst . lt is not recognized and that, as such, each constitutes a representational aspect of a more subtle and more comprehensive framework (cf. Rene Thom's approach). In fact, however apparently distorted or inadequate the attempt, its degree of "distortion" identifies the location of its advocates in relation to other perspectives, challenges, and problems of comprehension. Such relationships are governed by numbers indicative of qualitative distinctions.
ll.l0 It is to be hoped that this paper has demonstrated the importance of a new approach to representation and the posslbilities for it. lt may indeed be argued that Johan Galtung's emphasis (56) on the need to switch from the conventioinal "facts-theory" to a "facts-theory-value" (i.e. from 2-term to 3-term) ap-20 proach, should be extented to "facts-theory-valve-representation" (4-term), or beyonds2 . The dynamics resulting fbrm facts-theory are too well-known. but the difficulties are not eliminated by his 3-term suggestion. Basically, if insights cannot be meaningfully represented, they are incomprehensible and therefore irrelevant to the period in which they are formulated. 11.11 Finally in the words of Bennett: "For a long time, men have look-ed for ways of getting beyond the dyad: but mankind as a whole remains bound by sentiments of excJusion and contradiction. Meanwhile the progress of science and technology is leading us towards structured notions of greater and greater cornplexity. T'he same is true of nearly all branches of life: psychology ancl sociology, art, history and religion; all are moving away from naive expectations of simple unstructured solutions to human problems and towards the recognition that we and the world in which we live are an organized complexity that can be understood -even to the limited extent that we do understand -only by discerning the structures that bind us together". ( (45), vol. 3, p. 7a 5). Or in the words of Bateson: "Break the pattern which connects tl-re items of learning and you necessarily destroy all quality". (l12, p. 8) Unrelated set elements break patterns.
Annex I Clarification of terminology
The definitions given below are those of J. G. Bennett ((45), vol. 3, p. l0 ll) and are given as a basis for his elaboration of a muiti-term sequence in Annex 2. In the main part of this article "set" has been used to signify what Bennett defines as "system", although the two terms have been used interchangeably. "1. A system is a set of independent but mutually relevanî terml 'l'he relevance of the terms requires them to be compafióle. No one term of the system can be understood without reference to all the others. 2. The order of a system is given by the number of terms. " . . 3. In systems, there are no fixed meanings attributable to the term, which depend upon the structure of the system as a whole, so the various connectivities are common to all systems of the same order. 4. Every system exemplifies modes of connectedness that are typical of the number of tenns. Thus there are zero connectivities in a monad (one-term). one in a dyad (two-terrn) . . . ìf the connectivities are distinguished according to direction, the number is doubled. All the connectivities are significant and must be taken into account if the structure represented by the system is to be understood. 5. Each order of system is associated with a particular mode of experiencing the world, called the systemic attribute. . . . 6. The mutual relevance of all the terms of a system requires that they should be of the same logical type and make contributions to the svstemic attribute of one and the same kind. This we shall indicate by a common designation. . . . 7. The independence of the terms of a system requires that each should have a distinctive character. An important part of the study of systems consists in identifying the term clwracters of systerrrs of a given order.... 8. The mutual relevance oi ternrs oi a cornpiex systent can be found, to a iirst approxiniation, by taking all the terms in pairs. l'hese are called the first-order connectivities Connectivities of a higher order can be studied as sub-svstems fron.r the tetrad (4-term ) onwards . . ."
Annex 2
Example of an elaboration of a number-based sequence of systems
The series below was developed by J. G. tsennett (45) Comprehension of the sysiems proceeds in a definite sequence, given their order of emergence into awareness anri the minirnum nunrber of terms required to exemplify their attributes. Only 12 systems are identified here, although systems of' any number of terms may be considereci in order to encompass lvhatever degree of concreteness one is capatrle of grasping. The limitation is one of understanding.
A particular system never exlÌausts the possibilitv of description and comprelrension for, whatever number of terms is reached, some degree of abstraction remains and additional terms must be admitted in order to move towards a greater concreteness. Growth in understanding requires recognition of the representationa.l porver of successive systerns and a deepening apprecntion of iheir significance. As irnplied here ancl as stressed in the main text, Bennett's word hbels and comments are only íruii-cative and do not encompass or exluttst the meanings to which they reJ'er. Ther indicative power may be severely eroded by irrelevant polysemantic associstioits and increasingly so for the 3-term case and above. Conversely the richness of nreaning in a given case is indicated by the symbol cornplexes which cuitures produce to exemplify such systems. l ire symbols may facilitaie a better intuitive grasp of each system as a whole, in contrast to the fragmented comprehension rezulting from the follcwing descriptions presented as linear iext.
1-term representatktn and comprehension ("t'Vholeness") Systemic attribute: universality. Term ciesrgnation: totality. Term character: diversity in unity.
Any situation to wirich we direct our atiention is a monad, but some exemplify the systemic attribute of universality more strongly thari others. The monadic 21 character of the universe as a totaiity is present in ail its parts. Wholeness is universal and ornnipresent but relative; it may be transformed into identity. The combination of confused immediacy and the expectation of finding an organized structure gives the monad a progressive character; it is rvhat it is. but it holds the promise of being rnore than it appears to be.
Aspects of wholeness: unity, coherence, togetherness, compieteness, order, organization. Any pair oi ierms between which both connection and disjunction are recognized, although few pairs stand in more than weak opposition to one another or with more than insignificant connection. Through polarity, everything is in a state of strain which polarity itself can do nothing to relieve. If gives rise to force which may be tranformed into direction. It can neither show irow oppositions arise nor how they may be resolved. Its closule is not that of completeness.
Aspects of pclarity: active/passive; pleasantlunpleasant, likeidislike, etc.
3-tenn representation and comprehensiore ("Relatedness") Systemic attribute: dynamism. Terrn desìgnation: impuises. Term characters: l, affirmation; 2, receptivity; 3, reconciliation. Connectivities (lst order): acts (1 2, generation, 2 3, consent; 3 -1, decision). Connectivities (2nd orrìer): actions (l 2 3, expansion; 1 3 2, interaction:3 '2 l, freedom;2 I -3,concentration; 2 3 -1, identitiy;3 1 2, order). E,very dynamic structure has the form of a triad and ihe three independent impulses found are those to which ail relationships are reducible. Such relatedness may be transfornieti into interaction. The triad shows how acts enter into the structure of the world and resolve contladictions.
4-term representation and comprehensiorz ("Subsistence")
Systemic attribute: activity. Term designation: source. Term characters: motivational (1. ground; 2, goal): operational (3, direction; 4. instrument). Connectivities ( I st order): interplays Subsistence is the limitation of existence within a framework and may be transformed into maintenance. The tetrad specifies an event. It is the form of all activities that lead to a change of order and as such is inherently inflexible. lts very nature is to be an activity of transformation. Its lack of central emphasis allows activity to be studied as ordered diversity, but preven*rs the association of the activity with a particular entity. lndeed it does not allow for the existence of separate ent ities.
5-term representation and comprehension ("Potentialitv") Systemic attribute; significance. Subsidiary attributes: potentiality and meaning. Term designation: limit. Term characters: l, intrinsic; internal limits (2, lower; 3, upper); external limits (4, upper; 5, lower). Connectivities (lst order); mutualities (10 dyads). Connectivities: (2nd order): l0 triads. Connectivities (3rd order); 5 tetrads.
Meaning and potentiality must be added to activity, if the significance of a structure for itself (and for the totality that contains it) is to be specified. Only then does a structure become a bounded significant entity. Such entities have limits of significant connectedness with the outer world and limits of connectedness with their inner range of meaningful potentialities. Everything that exists has potentialities for actualization that outstrip the relationships that it can sustain within any concrete situation.
6-t erm repre sen tation and comprehenslon ( "Repetition") Systemic attribute: coalescence. Subsidiary attributes: recurrence, progress and self-realization, independence, form of events. Term designation: law (governing the coalescence of events). Term characters: I , order; 2, expansion; 3, identity; 4, freedom; 5, concentration; 6, interaction. Connectivities (1st order): steps.
Coalescence is understood as the property of structure, whereby significance acquùes depth and enrichment and yet retains the unique character associated with a particular event. The hexad, as progressive cyclicity, is the system most appropriate for sutdying structures in a step-by-step process of realizing their significance as events. It expresses the two-fold character of creation and counter-creation and also the movement of the entire process towards a goal. Although potential energy can be stored up indefinitely, it can only renew itself through the repetitive two-fold action of a disturbing and a restoring force. Success in action requires a balance between attention to what actually is and what potentially might be; events continue to transform themselves even when their actualization is completed. However the hexad does tend to emphasize the separateness and isolation of such events from one another.
7 -tenn representatio n and comprehension (" Structure") Systemic attribute : transformation. Sub sidiary attributes : structure, history. Term designation: state. Term characters: l, initiation; 2, invoivement; 3, separation; 4, harmonization; 5, insight; 6, renunciation; 7, completion. Connectivities (1st order): intervals. Connectivities (2nd order): harmonies.
A structure is a self-regulating system capable of relativeìy independent existence. Such a system is no longer closed and changes in the environment accompany changes in the entity. A transformational superstructure is therefore provided by the heptad to reconcile the selfrealization requirement of the well-defined entity (namely the acquisition of new properties that were previously neither potential nor possible) and the dissolution of 22 identity required for integration as a part within a whole. A heptadic system is required whenever there is change involving a real gain or loss in significance. By such transformation, significant events are integrated into the stream of universal historv. Individuality (whether actuaiized or potential) is the source of initiative residing in organized structures; it rnay be transformed into endurance, and is also a unique centre of conscious subjective experience. The octad is able to represent organized structures and historical processes ranging in scale from unity to totality. Its value is classificatory, interpretative, lieuristic and predictive. It rs however only applicable to structures organized in depth.
9 -t e nn r ep re se n t a t io n and c o mp r el t e n sí o n ("P alter n" ) Systemic attribute: harmonization. Term designation sources (3), steps (6) .
Experience would lose all coherence if there were not alwaysactive sources of order residing in the pattern of organized structures. The ideal completion of the octad does not take into account tlie uncertainty and hazard encountered in actual experience. The ennead permits the representation of everyday working structures (disturbed by unpredictable environmental factors in which harmony is established and maintained. The harmonization is dynamic and indeterminate.
1 }-term representatio n and co mprehensiorz ("Creativity") Systemic attribute : integrative complementarity.
In all experience there is evicience of a creative (pattern generating) activity that is not only the source of order but also the vehicle of disorder a polarity exemplified by the decad. At this level several sets of processe are able to compensate for one another's defects and produce an overall harmony that reacts on, and sustains the individual structures.
I l-term representation and comprehension ("Domination") Systemic attribute : synergism This is the highest form of relatedness and is the power, subject only to the law of necessity, that reconclles order and disorder through the agency of creativity It provides the conditions for mutual completion ot structures of different kinds. 'l'he dodecad is significant as a master pattern for understanding all total structures of the universe, because it is the first system in which the main elements of experience can all be represented. It combines dynamism and diversity, or relativity and relatedness. It is the culmination of the transformations whereby the structure of existence is first disordered, then corrected, then redeemed and finally perfècied. Autocracy is the primary affirmation by which all possible experience is brought into existence whether as potential pattern or as the actual process of the universe. [t is the element that acts without dominating. wills without reacting, and unifies all possibilities.
Annex 3
Clarification of specific sets l. Eliciting subordinate sets: relating distinctir-tns If a set is named (e.g. "development"), tlie question may be askeci in how many ways possible elements rnay be distinguished by subdividing the set. 2Jevel distittction: The set may, for example, be split into 2 subsets, but in how many ways may this be done in a particular case? Depending on the level at which the distinction is made, there may be l. 1,3,4, or N recognized 2-level distinctions; namely the most fundamental, and successively less fundarnentai levels of distinction. Clearly these are not unrelated, since the less fundamental distinctions are regrouped in distinctions at more fundamental levels. For example, at the level at which only 4 distinctions can be recognized, the regrouping would tend to bear a relationship to the level at which oniy 8 distinctions are made (by regrouping pairs of distinctions). On initial examination of all such 2-ievel distinctions, there would tend to be some confusion as to the levei to which they should be allocated in order that the most fundamental should not be embedtled in a set of less fundamentai distinctions. 1'he probability of any particular 2-level distinction being advocated as most fundamental is iikeiy to be higher. the greater the number of possible distinctions at that 1evel. (Namely it is less likely that the more fundamental 2level distinctions would be recognized.)
On the other hand this tendency is counter-balanced by the lower stabllity, viability and acceptability of the less fundamental distinctions. Cver longer periods of time they are meaningful to fewer and are of less value to the ordering of perceptions, however vigorously the use of any particular one may be advocated.
In sorting out to which level each 2-level distinction belongs, reference may be rnade to the pattern of reiations between the various distinctions at that level in the light of the underlying qualitative characteristics of the number associated with that level (see Annex 2, for example).
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3-level distinction: The set may however be split into 3 subsets. As before, it is a question of the number of ways in which this may be done in a particular case. The argument above applies again.
l,l-level distirtction: Clearly the argument may be generalized for N-level distinctions aithough, in the light of earlier arguments, N is unikely to exceed about 10.
Now the procedure adopted to clarify the ordering at any particular N-level, effectively clarifies the nature oi the most fundamental distinction for N = 2,3,4...N. Tiris in turn provides an ordered configuration of aspects which exernplify the nature of the original totality (i.e. N = l) whicir was explored by subdivision.
Elicitittg superordinate sets
In addition to proceeding by subdivision. clarification concerning a named set (e.g. developrnent) may be sought by determining of what sets it may be considered to be a part. Note that rnany of the existent fundamental sets are identified or named by enumerating their elements. The name of the set, if any, derives from them in then plurality and not 1ìorn any concept of the singular totality they constitute as a set (e.g. human values, human rights, etc.) 2-level combination: The set may, for example, be paired with one other set to form a 2-element set. But in how many ways may this be done in a particular case, given that the pairing cannot be arbitrary but must be based on some aspect of the quality associated with the number 2 (see Annex 2, for example). Such combinations could be ordered and clarified as suggested by the previous section.
3Jevel combinqtion: The set could be grouped with 2 other sets to form a 3-element set. As before it is a question of ordering the ways in which this rnay be done to clarify the many possible aspects of the superordinate set.
N-level combination: Again the argument may be generalized, although it is unlikely, as before, that the total in the resulting set would exceed about 10. Inthis procedure it may well be that particular combinations are not meaningful or useful. Clearly it becomes increasingly difficult, as N increases, to integrate the original set into a combination. But at any stage, a further procedure may be adopted to identify. for an N-level combination, what, zuccessively, the elements of an N-I, N 2. . . .N-M combination are. This clarifies the aspects of the nature of the more fundamental superordinate sets (where N M = 1) which may underiy any given set. Again the qualitative characteristics of number (Annex 2) may be used as a guide.
Annex 4
Symbol generation l. In a system with P terms, it should be possible to identify by analysis (with computer assistance and graphic output) configurations of the P terms (linked by Q relationship s), selected in order of their degree of sym' metry îor a given value of P. Constraints on the rnaxi. mum and minimum value of Q in each case could also be partialiy determineci in terms of syrnmetry reqtrucmerlts. Tabies of such corrfiguralions. u,itltout considering symmetry, have been produt:cd by Frank Élarary (l2a). The less symmetrical structnres, fbr a given P value, sirould then prove to be thcse of less piobable value in the iepresentaiion of the central concept although possrbly of more value in representing an aspect of it. And indeed the "traditional" diagrarns are those which arc likely to be prorninent in iire results although valuable new ones may weil be discovereci by tiris procedure.
2. The same proceiure may now be apphed for tite representation of P-term sl'srems in 3 dinrensions. [{ere the synmetry constraints are more scvere. This procedrrre shoulci preferenrially seiect the reguiar and semireguiar polyhedra (wiren P is even) or less weli-knowrì strucrures (.wiren P is odd) (ll), (13), (125) .
3. The procedure mav be made more powerful if, for a given P-temr system the structure selected is based upon P equal io: eitlier number of edges of the structure LìT or ' number of sides of the structure ' number ofvertexesoithe structure las abcve) or number of axes of syr',rrnetry.
For, in terms of representation, it rnay, be as mean.
ingtul to associate an aspect oi the P-terrn systerii with anv such rrurnerable features. 1he empriiasís rs cn ortiering siructures in tel'tns of probable icorricrty, with iire expectaiion that f-arniiies oí decreasing iconicity vrill be distinguisired bi" the proceciure for a giveir value cf P. Sucli families nray be nrore vaiuable Í'or representing aspects of.the central ccncept. althouaì.r tÌie highly asvrnrrìetric strucîures irr any fanril;; prcbabiy reflect the various forrris of pie-comprehensioi:r, rnis-cornpiehensio or ,.'or.!-coitìl.1rcÌrcnsicn of the crtncept. infornration gaps of this kind in edi;cation irave been rnodelletì in graph theory terrns (126 Ì 2'>ì).83 4. A variation on tire procedure in I dirnensions is to allow each terrl to be representeci: b;'. the same sirr,ple shape (circle, square, etc) and to seieci symmetric conf igurations in wtricir the reiationships arc represented erthcr bv tile points of contact between shapes or from unpiicit svmmetry fcatures (sec (22), (30), ani 1-<rr; on net diagrams fcr exa;nPte ). or 'oy tii;Jueill siiiipie snapr'!. cach cl.raracterzir,g a difl'erent aspect. This proceCure sirouiC seìec'r out many well-kilown slimb'.-lls ( 130|.
-S. Again tiris variation may'be appiied in 3 dirnensions using simple soiids insteacì of flat shapes. r\s mentioi^red earlier ihe possible c<;nfigurations are then governeci by well-known packing cons'rraints (22) , (:.ì).
Notes:
Further attention should be gtven îo O-element sets and tilùir significance. Obtaining a "good fit" is essentially a problem of design and indeed in his influential book crr the sub;ect, Christoplier Alexander (ref.
2) devotes several chapters to the question. Deciding on the boundaries of a set and distinguishing ítse!e' ments is a problem of design as Alerander would see 'it (as is the problern of elaborating a suitabie representation, p:rrticularly when the reialionships beîrveen the elements are taken into account). He notes: "The ultimate object of design is form . . . everl' design problem begins with an effort to achieve fitness between tlvo entlties: the form in question anC its context. The form is the solution to the problem; the contcxt defines the problem. ln other words, when we speak of design, the real oblect of discussion is not the forrn alone, but the ensernble comprising the form and its context. Good fit is a desiled properiy of this ensemble rvhich relates tc, some particular division of the ensembie into form end context." (p. [15] [16] And also: "What does mtrke design a problem in real world cases is that we are trying to make a diagram of folces rvhose field we do not understand. Understanding the field of the context and inventing a form to fit it ale really two aspects ol the sarìe process. It is because the conte\t is obscure that we cannot give a dilect, fully coherent criterion for the fit rve ate tryilg to achieve; and it is also its obscurity which makes the task of shaping a rvell-fitting forrn at all probiematic. . . I should like to recommend that ',tr'e always expect to see the process of achieving good iit between two entities as a negative process of neutralizing the incongruities, or irritants, or forces, which causemisfit." (p.21 24) 3 It would be a simple matter to select, from papers of a wide range of disciplines or administrative activities, lists of "basic points" made (possibly with sub-point coding if any can now be less plausibly explained by a single parameter and that under certain circumstances the value falls from 7 to 2 (on which point see the peaks in the curve oi Fig. 1 ). It appears that il is short-tern memory rvhich can only handle information by chunks of 7. This corrstraint does not apply to long-term memory. However îhis does not change the fact that the sets under discussion usually contain about 7 chunks or less -possibly because access to such sets and their representations is necessarily via short-term memory. 6 Alex Bavelas and Horvard Permutter, classified work done at the Center for International Stuilies, MIT, quoted in "The relation of knowledge to action", by Ma,x Millikan (see (40) p. 164).
7 Antony Jay, in (8) , identifies size limitations tbr organizations: "ten group" of 3-12 (rvork group, project group, task force); "camp" of 20-60 (work group plus those dependent upon their activity oi sewicing their requirements); "tribe" of 300-1000 (identity group, mutual recognition); "kingdom" of 5,000-60,000 (administrative, social, cultural or military'eoherence); "empire" of 100,000r. It would be -interesting to explore the change in the nature of government once the nurnbet of ministries and cabinet ministers exceeds the criticai number for sma-ll groups (see (7) ) and the usual constraints on span of control. I ln the light of the NSF exercise, it will be interesting to note the organization of the results of the exercise launched in i978 by the US Otfìce of Technologv Assessment "on the ioentification of major long-range problems and opportunities facing Aritetican society". ) A.n intergovernmental meeting may give rise to a many-pointed declaration as the basis for a programme of action. This is then progressively condensed into a plogralnme grouped under a numbet of heàdings within the number constraint notcd. (Consider the evolution of the UN Environment Programme from 1972, for exarnple.) Where an action programne does not emerge, the number of points remans unóonsirained by the limit, particularly in legalistic declaiations of principles such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (31 articles). But even here, such a declaration would be unacceptable if it had I 31 articles, so a new constraint may be in operation. l0
From which arises the whole problem of communication with the non-scholar ald between scholars of ditTerent disciplines. t1 Magoroh Maruyama has consistently argued that the hierarchical orieintation is only one of four cultttraìly deterrnincd epistemologicai standpoints and is characteristic of the following cultures: European (and American), Islamic, Hindu, Japanese, Yamato, Kwekiutl, for example (see (11) and (1 2)). 12 "lt appears that the attention paid hitherto in exact science to increasing precision of analysis into smaller and smaller parts needs now to be supplemented by a method capable of representing the processes of complex systems composed of many parts. But thete is no sign as yet of a simpie comprehensive method of describing the changing form or structure of a complex of relationships." (ref . (3'l) , p237) This point is discussed in further detail in a later section. Problems also arise when creation of the set is expected to improve the status and prestige of the producer at the expense of others -who rnay have produced theit own or may thereby be .challenged into doing so. Such dynamtcs cannot be discussed rationally in the same arena as for the con lent. t5 Note that this "basic distinction" constitutes a 2-elentent set which is subject to many of the points made in this paper. 16 (22) and (23) . "When man employs nature's basic designing tools, he needs only generaiized angles and special-case frequencies to describe any and all omnidirectional patterning experience subjectively conceived or objectively realized. For how many cycles of relative-experience timing shall we go in each angular direction before we change the angle of direction of any unique system-describing operation?" ((i), p.248-9). It seems to be time to îecognize the extraordinaty resistance of each social science profession to the application of the insights of its own discipline to itself as a social group, and to integrate this into the research process. There is a real blindspot, as has been noted with respect to one discipline at least (but not necesseLrily by many of its ptactitioners): "But sociologists have been reluctant to test empidcally the relevance of many hypotheses. . . for the development of knowledge in sociology. Studies on the impact of the social organization of the discipline, the prevailing climate of opinion, and the social background and personal values of researchers have been out of fashion. . ." (p. 45) and "sociologists are notorious for studying everything except their orvn discipline and its institutional patterns" (p. 55) from the introduction to The Sociology of Knowledge,edited by J. E. Curtis and J. W. Petras. London, Duckworth.1970. Jay Kelley remarks on an associated phenomenon: 'When an investigator acquires data and facts, he is improving order within his own sphere. The enttopy of the experimenter and his data pad and records is improving, but the moment the observer separates himself ftom his data, he no longer can claim the full possession ofvalue of the infotmation; the information is continually devalued as the observer accumulates other knowledge and as time passes. These observations lead to deeper questions of the nature of order and its human implications ((41), p. 179). For him: "Value implies accessibility to information, which reflects how it is ordered or its enttopy." "It seems to be quite evident that oneness stands out as the origin of the structure from whence feasible pattems can emerge as rigidly hierarchical, associative, or sequential. Of these the hierarchical patterns appear to have lasting qualities while associative and sequential features may confer richness ard flexibility... Thus, whether negotiating a computer or a sociological system the human conceives pattems from his singular frame of reference and must see and interpret the learned pattern from this state of oneness. Language and other standard ordered patterns tend somewhat to alleviate the plausible dilemma of a human having to interpret for himself from oneness to many independent patterns." ((41), p. 195) "The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts ofT an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstfuct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how the iamilìar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet.
"
He argues in favour of the fundamental validity of the ancient philosophical intuition that the "dynamical situations governing the evolution of natural phenomena are basically the same as those governing the evolution of man and societies, profoundly justifying the use of anthropomorphic words in physics. Inasmuch as we use the word "conflict" to express a well-defined geometrical situation in a dynamical system, there is no objection to using the word to describe quickly and qualitatively a given dynamical situation. When we geometrize also the words "information", "message", and "plan", as our models are trying to do, any objection to the use of these tetms is removed." ( (32) into the system definition given in Annex 1. He also makes the following points. A class is an externally determincd sct of members and a system is an internally connected set of terms. When the internal connections are disregarded, the set de!íenerates from being a system to being a class. No actual class is wholly fìee from inner connections so that classes are abstractions whereas systems 3Je concretc (although to different degrees). "it is also possible to have an 'ordered' class or series, such as the first ten numbers. This is not a true system, for it does not take any account of the rnutual relevance of the terms except their order. Nevertheless, since the ordinal numbers are in certain respects intermediate between classes and systems, we cannot regard the distinction betrveen class and system as wholly free from ambiguity." ( (45) (45), vol. l) also refer to the implications of transfinite numbers in which the whole can be seen as reUected within the part. "Far liom restricting our efforts to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion of complementaity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such inquiry, whenevel the interaction between the measuring instrument and the objects forms an integral part of the phenomena." (Niels Bohr, in Essays 1958-1962;on atomic physics and human knowledge. New York, I'Viley, 1963)' Subidrttio, of a set (by the act of distinguishing elements) has been used rather than articulation, although the latter is preferable. It implies a respect for the functional relationships between the system elements (and an expression of them). whereas the former is solely concerned with their classical iogzcal relationships. See (9) (48) . He demonstrates that conventional arithmetic is in effect one of four types of arithmetic; the others have increasing degrees of indeterminacy and are more suited to handling problems in biology and physics. He proposes that one of them should be used as the basis for trialectic logic. Although Bennett's analysis is used by him as a basis for a much wider invcstigation which is not a matter of concern here. It is interesting to compare Bennett's exercise (in Annex 2) with Neelameghan's (63) application of semínal mnemonrcs as a pattern for systems analysis, which makes an attempt to associate ideas with the numbers I to 7. Although quite independent, there would appear to be some similzuity between them. 49 "Our community life is perhaps so structured that the vely moment we seek to glasp reaìity in all its concreteness we run after simulacra. The present set of texts takes as íts hypothesis that illusion and simulation have assumed in the Twentieth Century a power hitherto without parallel. We have entered, perhaps, the age oi the simulacrum." Special issue summary oÎ Traverses (Paris, Centre national d'art et de culture), 10, février 1978. 50 "Topics are the 'things'or subject matter of dialectic which came to be known as topoi through the places in which they were stored" ( (68) should also be considered as well as the role of portraits in political, religious and cultural personality cults.
There is of course a paradox associated with any such ultimate set. The act of distinguishing it necessarily establishes at least two subsets, for it necessarily incorporates the distinguisher as Spencer Brown demonstrates (18)' This relates to Jung's concept of '\rnus mundus" as an expression of the unity of existence founded: "on the assumption that the multiplicity of the empirical world rests on an underlying unity, and that not two or more fundamentally different worlds exist side by side or are mingled with one another. Rather, everything divided and different belongs to one and the same world, which is not the world of sense but a postulate whose probability is vouched for by, the fact that until now no one has been able to discover a world in which the known laws of nature are invalid" (77) . One is reminded of the possibility of aqualitative analogue to the "big bang" cosmological theory which postulates the universe as having been elaborated from a single homogeneous ball oî ptoto-matter. That the analogue might operate on standing wave principles, also merits reflection (note (78)). Von Franz ((.9), p. 77) notes the Chinese use of numbers as qualitative fields whose internal numerical structures "îe-present time phases of the fields dynamic intetnal structure." She quotes: "The ontological and logical ordering (of numbers) is translated into rhythmical and geometrical images. On account of their descriptive power, as exponents of concrete analysis, numbers are classificatory, and for that reason used to identify concrete sets. They can serve as rubrics, for they indicate the various types of organization which are imposed on things when they are manifest in their proper order in the cosmos. " ((4a), p. I 23)
In the light of the scheme presented in Annex 2, the 3-term "concept triangle" (see (59) ) is preceded in the series by the traditional 2-term "knower-known". lt may be followed by the 4-term "word-meaning-referent-observer" (and it is this which blurs into a single set at the limit condition). This series bears an interesting relationship to that derived from Galtung's "theory-fact-value" triangle as dtscussed in the conclusion. Note the terms change significance with addition of a term (see note 73), Zeman (80) specifically proposes a "gnose<llogical triangle": objective reality, the observing subject (i.e. conscious man), and expression. This combined with the concept triangle, constitutes a tetrahedron (4-tcrm). Except possibly through peak experiences (see (79) ). Von Franz stresses Jung's view "that there is little or no hope of illuminating this undivided existence except through antinomies. But we do know for certain that the empirical world of appearances is in some way based on a transcendental background." ((9), p. 9). Historically this has been represented by symbols (P. 303). 60 It is rather as though different witnesses to a crime were to attempt separately to describe the criminal by establishing an ldentikit portrait (a definition) using the kit components (words). Not only do the portraits differ from one another, but possession of a portrait however good does not magically result in the capture of the person identified. "recognition of the same object in the inl'inite multiplicity of its manifestations is, in itself, a problem (the classical philosophical problerl of concept) rvhich, it seems to me, the Gestalt ps;ychologists alone have posed in a geometric iramework accessible to scientific investigation" ((32), p. I ). Rudolf Arnheim in discussing thc same question, notes that Gestalt psychoiogists reccrgnize a tendenc). to "good fbrm" or "well organized structure" (88) L. l-. Whyte sees all mental processes such as mcmory, classification, choice, and wiil as "displeying a movemerit tc$,ard greater three-Jimensional spaîial order, synimetry, or forrn". And such morphic processes "are directly responsíble both for theexistenceoiforms, and of brain-minds themselves generating forms and being responsive to forms." ( (85), p. xvi) Jean Piaget also makes points which could be ìnterpreted to be in suppcrt of this position: "As a result, spatial structutes, from the biological point of view, bridge thc gap between logico-mathematical structures. the nature of rvhich is still unknown, and those structures which are either hereditary or. as is sometimes the case, acquirccl by learning" ((g6), p. 309). Also: "... cognitive functions are an extension of organic regulations and constitute a differentiated organ fbr regulating exchanges with ihe extemal world. The organ in question ís only partially differentiated at the level of innatc knowledge, but it becomes increasingly differentiated with logico-maîhematical structures and social exchanses or exchanges inherent in any kind of experirnent." ((86). p. 369). 65 I am indebeted to Colin Cherry (On Iluman Communication, I 968) for this insight (87).
66 It could be interesting to explore the possibilities ofportraying each term in a rnulti-term sl,stem by a human or animal figure and animaîing their interaction on graphics devices to produce a cartoon effect, using a computer programme governed by the original structure. (Supposedly many tblk tales are based on such structures) 67 Rudotf Arnheim notes ((gg), p. 207-g) that:
., . . . one must assume that structural characteristics of visual form are spontaneously related to similar characteristics in human behaviour. We have called this type of symbolism .isomorphic' because this is the term lrsed by gestalt psychologists to describe identity of structure in different media. . . . The eesture of a dancer. . . contain(s) structural features whose kinship with similarly structured mental features is immediately felt." Ritual dances are based on this insight and cven have their modern advocates: Steiner's eurythrny. Curdjieff's movements, Ichazo's Arica movcments, and the like. The aim belng to penetrate and exprcss the more fundamental forms and to use them as a mearìs of classifying experiences within a functional whole. It is no accident that Keith Critchlow in a book on design (22) incorporates laban's use of the icosahedron for dance notation 189). 68 It is interesting that in order to solve the problem Fuller has effectiveiy had to confront the constraints of the basic duality with which our cutture is faced as it is reflected in material forms. T'he "primitive" structuring effects of the duality have to be bypassed within a larger whole which depends on thenr for its integrity. This requires many more elenrents than the ideal forms, thus ccnforming to Bennett's insíght that a higher number of terms is required to provide a better approximation to reality. (Although the higher number is effectively reduced by the encoding properties of the underlying polyhedron in each case). 69 In terms of the status in society of fundamentat sets, there would seem to be an amusing parallel between the role of temples to different deities in the Rornan Empire and that of internationai agcncies with respect to globa'l society. Both the temples and the agencies each base their actions on weildelined sets of qualities.
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80 lnteresting example-{, which have n':ver been crossliitked, include Abellio (l l5). Buckrninster Ì:uller (l )' tiaskell (1 l6)' Dodd (117), tr-ock Land (118), Langharn (29)' Young (25) and (26) . Bennett (4.5). 'Ihe ìrestr:rn cquivalent rvhich has attracted the mosl tttcnticn is tirc i Ching: see NeeCham (119), Blij (120), Gardnet (llÌ). Sung (122) . ì'he recentlv remarked iink betwe.'n the I ('hing r:ode and thc genetic ccr.ic raises many qucsticns, sce Schònbergcr rn (i 2l). 81 Bennett i,otes ((45),vol.3,p.25i that:
"Many ot'the diificulties tn the interpictaÍlon of naturrri phtnon1cn:r ùl5c from treating quliltties as if they rcmain iiìe :;amt in passing from one system to anoilter." (c.g. from a l îeim system tÙ 3 3-term system, the adCed third tetnr modifior; the qualittes originally expresscri by the other t\r'o ttrnls) 82 Addition of "reprcsentalion" as t fourth elcment is airnosl certainl,v instrificient simply as a passive pattcrn. al the best inviting to the atte:1tion. As r',ith language in the Weit, it ntry simply cias:;ify experience without opening the cbstrter tÙ the aciion it :iugScsts. Ilertr lies a dangcr. Alreadl'uiiir crude representaiions uscrs of iìlc t-looci of text inloinrition are overlcacicd to thc point ol' bloci':agc or eficc'tiveiy insulated from expericnce lrl' suitablc expianaticn rnci depiction. Sornc more iccntc sophisl,cùted representalion rniiy cniy reinforce the user's passtvit!,, ill'iereas appropriaie representaiion lna)' ofler the uscr thc visual configuralion through u'hrch tù 4(/ participalively and experienttailf icf. the contrast betr';een McLuhan's 'hot" and "cotrl" media). "r\ctivating poientiai"
would thus scent to l:t t fifth elcntent lìl thc seri'rs :1nC dn appropriate constlalnt cn rcproscntation. (f arn indc'l;tcd to Anthony (ì. F.. Blake,1br provoking lhesc insights.)
83 Sce (1 2tì) "Both gcometry and topology deal with the notron oi space, but gcomctry's preoccupation riith shapes and measure is repiac:ed in topology by more ilbstract, less restrictive ideas of the qualitics of things. . . (giving). . . h riclier f ormalism to adapt as a tool for the contemplation of ideas. . ."
ii4 'lhc truitlut area icientifieci is the use of a non-Boolearr (nontlistributive) latticc structure of corr,plementaly ol dialcctically developing languages (perspectives. categcries) rvhich reflects tlte logic of quaniuni mechanics (l:10. 141) A developmenîai sequence may emcrge either as the rcsuli o1'reseaiclt oi oi comprehenston 1cl. programmcd le.rrning pathuays) ihrough sr,age-r which appear 1Ììutually incompirtible for some perioJ. From the diagrams used by lleelan and de Nicolas' both sequence and conrplementilrlty can simuitaneousìy be representcd by deveiopmentai pathwiys trf polyhedral foinr rvhich, in tireir erampies, privilegc a -ttngle vertex {e'g in a cubic slructure) as the "lea:it uppcr bound clement". Richer possibilities, corresponcitng to non-duaiistic complemsntiìrlt!' rrf multi-term sets, could rvcll becomc comprehcnsible in the light of thc full range of pclyìredral structures nesttng polyhcdral pilth\r'ays to distinguish leveis of co-existing incornpatibie perspectivÈs (possibly iinked by e-'<periential or non-cunrulative leuning pathrvays, as rnight be represelited by a circular chain of overiapprng Venn eircies) from levcls at whicir complementarity is evidctit. Such polyhedral encirclemcnt, of an unknov,'n to be dcfjned progressiveiy ulthout closure. could facilitate tlre relationsiilps betri'een viewpolnts as discussed else*here (142.).
